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It is with sadness that we at Carolina Planning note the passing of John A."Jack"* Parker,
Professor Emeritus and former chair of the Department of City and Regional Planning at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Mr. Parker died on March 18.2001 at the age of 91. A
native of Kentville. Nova Scotia, he graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a
B.Sc. degree in Architecture and masters degrees in Architecture and Planning.
In 1946. Mr. Parker accepted an invitation to develop a graduate program in planning at the
University of North Carolina. He served as the chair of the Department until his retirement in 1974.
"He was absolutely a pioneer." said Dr. Ed Kaiser, professor of planning at UNC. "He helped
develop the notion of regional planning. And he made this the first program in the country actually
based on a social science orientation... He took students under his wing. He would get a roster of
students in the department and hold court with each student, asking them about their aspirations and
what they were trying to accomplish."
During and after his tenure at DCRP, Mr. Parker was a tireless supporter of Carolina Planning.
and his generous financial and moral support made the publication of this journal possible. He will be
greatly missed.
Mr. Parker s family suggests that all memorials he made to the
John A. and .Jane C. Parker Endowment Fund, Office of University
Development, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
P.O. Box 309, Chapel Hill, NC 27514-1)309.
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From the Editors: Editors
Elizabeth Federico
Kenneth Ho
We have been pleased with the Amanda Huron
responses to our last issue, which focused on Robin Zimbler
efforts to rebuild in the wake of the devastating
hurricanes that hit the North Carolina coast in Carolina Planning is published twice a year with
1999. This issue's articles cover a broader generous financial support from:
variety oftopics, but are linked by the underlying
theme of land use decisions. Whether • The John A. Parker Trust Fund
addressing environmental, transportation or • The Department of City and Regional
housing concerns, land use policy can play a key Planning
role in creating solutions. • The North Carolina Chapter of the American
We begin with updates on open space Planning Association
and smart growth initiatives in North Carolina by
• The Department of City and Regional
Marc DeBree and Elizabeth Federico. Next. Planning Alumni Association
Robert J. Schneider writes on improving
-n
XI
coordination of land use and transportation in Subscriptions:
O
-H
North Carolina's Research Triangle area through Annual subscription rates are
Im
new forms of regional governance and






Students and APA members $ 1 0. oX>
The next three pieces examine tactics
for providing affordable housing, a topic of
Back issues, including postage $8.
CO
growing concern nationwide. Spencer Cowan Carolina Planning welcomes comments.
introduces us to the inclusionary land use suggestions, and submissions. Mail to:
regulations enacted by five states to encourage
Carolina Planning
UNC- Chapel Hill, CB#3 140developers to build affordable units. Lanier
Blum discusses local inclusionary housing Chapel Hill. NC 27599-3 140
programs and the prospects for developing such Phone:(919)962-4783
policies in North Carolina. And Sonia Garrison.
Email: carplan'ajunc.edu
Christine Westfall. Alison Weinerand Erin
Crossfield describe the community land trust The editors wish to thank David Godschalk and
model, and how the Orange Community Housing
Li la Berry.
Corporation is using a land trust to provide
sustainable affordable housing in and around Cover Image:
Chapel Hill.
Placing modular affordable housing on its
Finally, we return to the theme of
foundation in the Walltown neighborhood in
hurricane recovery, as Dan Broun describes Durham, NC. Part of Self-Help's efforts to
Self-Help's innovative program to assist child
create affordable housing as part of
care providers whose businesses were disrupted community redevelopment efforts in the
by Hurricane Floyd. For the larger recovery
region. To read more about Self-Help s
program to be successful, he points out. basic
innovative programs see Dan Broun s article
services such as child care must be in place.
on page 43.
With this issue, we have added a Letters
to the Editor section. We're interested in reader Copyright 200 1 . the Department of City and
response to the ideas presented here, and hope Regional Planning
to generate a continuing discussion of planning
issues of the Southeast. We look forward to Printed by UNC Printing Services on recycled
hearing from you. paper
Letters to the Editor
7 December 2000 growth plans. Such a tiered system also might
be considered for the coastal area, reducing the
Congratulations on your Summer 2000 requirement for full-scale comprehensive plans
special issue. "Planning Our Coast." The to the twenty counties and the larger cities, and
articles raise a number of important and simplifying the planning requirements for smaller
interesting questions related to why we care towns. This would facilitate substantive plan
about, and have enacted laws and programs to review and make it easier to hold localities
oo protect, our coastal environment and those who responsible for their share of environmental
CD use it. protection.
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Richard Norton asks if local land use plans
Q.
prepared under the North Carolina Coastal David R. Godschalk
Management Act should be judged on the basis Stephen Baxter Professor of City and
2 of the planning procedures used or the substance Regional Planning
of the plans. If substance is judged, do local University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill
Q.
goals for economic development take




My view is that planning procedures are
O
important, but substance is key. Environmental
protection should be the first priority, with
economic development to take place with the
least possible environmental disruption.
Coastal water quality is one clear and valid
measure of the effectiveness of local plans and
their implementation. County plans should be
reviewed and approved relative to their track
record in protecting coastal water quality. And.
as Rachael Franks points out. NPDES permits,
tied to plans, can be effective tools for water
quality protection, along with zoning, best
management practices, and land acquisition. I
would add land suitability analyses and smart
growth strategies to that list.
The North Carolina Commission to Address
Smart Growth. Growth Management, and
Development Issues is scheduled to report to the
General Assembly in January 200 1 . It may
recommend a tiered statewide planning program.
with smaller localities preparing simpler smart
Planner's Digest
Million Acre Initiative Gets Underway Does your community have all the parks,
trails and greenways it needs?
Marc deBree Are your drinking water supplies
permanently protected?
In January of 2000. Governor Jim Hunt Are important historic and cultural areas
unveiled the Million Acre Initiative, a challenge to permanently protected? "D
2
permanently protect an additional million acres of Does your agricultural community have
open space in North Carolina. This initiative adequate access to the protection m
came in response to a series of community provided by conservation easements? COD
meetings across the state in 1999 in which Has the potential damage from floods in CDm
Governor Hunt's Interagency Task Force on your community been minimized by
CO
H
Smart Growth solicited public input regarding the sufficiently protecting floodplain areas?
future growth of North Carolina. A clear If wildlife habitats or areas that sustain
message that resonated throughout many of rare species are important parts of your
these public forums was the need to protect community, have they been permanently
integral open spaces threatened by sprawling protected?
growth in North Carolina. If game lands are important to your
The Million Acre Initiative hopes to achieve community, have they been permanently
its goal of protecting open space in North protected?
Carolina by providing coordination and technical
assistance to both public and private agencies If your answer to any of these questions is
and organizations in support of their land no. then your community may benefit from the
acquisition efforts. Although the Million Acre support of the Million Acre Initiative. Please
Initiative itself will not acquire land, the initiative look to the Million Acre Initiative website at
will work with public and private partners to www.ncparks.net/millionacre for more
develop effective land acquisition programs. information.©
Such programs will be driven by locally
generated priorities for land protection and will
fashion locally appropriate conservation
measures, such as fee simple purchase and
easements, to ensure the protection of
designated lands in perpetuity.
To determine ifthe Million Acre Initiative
can help your community protect its essential
open spaces, you should ask yourself the
following questions:
Marc deBree is the Coordinator of the
Million Acre Initiative through the North
Carolina Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. He holds a Masters
Degree in City and Regional Planning from
the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
Smart Growth in North Carolina
Elizabeth Federico
The North Carolina Smart Growth
Commission completed its year-long mission in
January with a list of recommendations for the
future of land use policy in the state. The group
agreed that the state legislature should grant
local governments a set of new tools with which
to manage growth. These tools will enable local
governments to have more authority to regulate
development and levy taxes and fees. The
Commission also advised the legislature to
develop a smart growth vision and to create a
permanent commission with clear guidelines to
ensure that state agencies implement the vision.
The Commission concluded that in order to
achieve regional coordination of local land use
plans, municipal and county governments require
sufficient authority to regulate development and
raise money for infrastructure and other
improvements. It suggested that all local
governments be given the power to assess taxes
like those granted to Charlotte in 1997. The
state legislature allowed Mecklenburg County
residents to vote on a half-cent sales tax
measure to help fund local transportation
projects. Currently, only a handful of local
governments have similar powers.
Other recommendations include requiring
set-asides for moderately-priced housing in new
housing projects, building more schools in urban
areas, locating state offices in already developed
areas, and implementing new measures to
protect farmland, wetlands and beaches.
Despite the progress made by the
Commission, there remain many points of
contention on which Commission members could
not reach consensus. Not the least of these is a
functional definition ofwhat "smart growth"
actually is and what guidelines should be utilized
for proper implementation ofthe Commission's
recommendations. As a result, many of the
Commission's recommendations remain in a
conceptual stage of planning.
The General Assembly is expected to
resolve a number these issues over the coming
years, including how to ensure proper
representation on the permanent commission and
assigning who will be responsible for
coordinating local plans at the regional level.
However, w ith the current budgetary crisis, the
legislature will be challenged to balance
increased government costs and oversight with a
reduced operating budget. Proposals to spend
more money on farmland preservation, for
example, are not likely to be implemented right
away. The co-chairmen of the Commission.
Representative Joe Hackney and Senator
Howard Lee. plan to meet to prioritize its
proposals and advise ranking members of the
legislature.®
Source: The Raleigh News and Observer
Elizabeth Federico is a master's degree
candidate in City and Regional Planning at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
Additional Smart Growth Resources &
Information
In anticipation of the Smart Growth
Commission's final report, other academic
journals have devoted pages to a discussion of
the legal and institutional aspects of growth
management. The Fall 2000 edition of Popular
Government, published by the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill's Institute of
Government, is a special issue focusing on
"Growing Smart in North Carolina." Likew ise.
the Wake Forest Law Review dedicated its Fall
2000 issue to an evaluation of smart growth
initiatives both in North Carolina and throughout
the southeast. For links to other publications
dealing w ith sustainable development in the
region, visit the North Carolina Smart Growth
Alliance website at www.ncsmartgrowth.org.
Changing Institutional Structures to
Improve the Coordination of Land Use and
Transportation in the Research Triangle
Robert J. Schneider
Introduction
When Sandy Ogburn. Assistant to the
General Manager at Triangle Transit Authority
(TTA). first arrived in the North Carolina
Research Triangle region from Philadelphia, she
planned to stay only two years. However,
because of "the slower pace of life, all the
amenities in the region, and the beautiful blue
color of the sky." she and her family have made
the Triangle home for over 25 years. During that
time. Ms. Ogburn has been an active member of
the Triangle community, serving as a member of
the Durham City Council, as chair of the
Durham-Chapel Hill-Carrboro Metropolitan
Planning Organization (DCHC MPO)
Transportation Advisory Committee, and as chair
of the TTA Board of Directors.
Unfortunately, recent trends may threaten
the high quality of life that has attracted people,
like Ogburn. and businesses to the Triangle in the
past. Traffic congestion and air pollution
problems that have plagued other fast-growing
metropolitan areas have come to the Triangle.
According to the North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (NC
DENR). the Research Triangle region
experienced eight Code Red ("unhealthy") and
twenty-three Code Orange ("unhealthy for
sensitive groups") ozone days in 1 999 (NC
DENR 2000). Automobile emissions are a major
source of this pollution, and an inefficient
regional transportation system contributes to the
emissions problem by exacerbating traffic
congestion. Traffic volumes on Interstate 40 at
the Wake-Durham county line increased from
about 7 1 .000 vehicles per day in 1 990 to over
1 1 ,000 vehicles per day by 1 995 (Eisenstadt and
Hoar 1995). Commuters often spend an hour
traversing the 10-mile stretch of Interstate 40
between Research Triangle Park and Raleigh.
The region's congestion problem has increasingly
drawn press coverage, with helicopter traffic
reports and live views from traffic cameras
broadcast each night on the local news.
Ms. Ogburn attributes much of the blame for
the Triangle's worsening congestion to a lack of
coordination between the region's land use and
transportation decision-makers. She stated in a
recent interview, "We [in the Triangle region] are
quickly going the way ofmany large metropolitan
areas by not acting regionally. Air pollution does
not stop at the county line. It's not a Durham
problem. It's not a Raleigh problem. It's our
problem as a region." She suggests also that the
economic viability ofthe Triangle, which is
dependent on the region's quality of life, will be
damaged when agencies and municipalities act
individually. Over the past few years, businesses
have begun to question moving to and staying in
the Triangle because their employees are
frustrated with air pollution and traffic congestion
problems. Ogburn warns. "Ultimately, without
regional coordination, our quality of life will be
diminished, and the Triangle will become a less
desirable place to live. People will search for
greener pastures— literally" (Ogburn 2000).
Air pollution and traffic congestion are one
result of land use and transportation decisions
that are made by individual municipalities, such
as Raleigh, Durham. Chapel Hill, and Cary,
without consideration of their effects on the
region as a whole. These four cities and nearby
communities compose the Triangle region of
North Carolina (Figure 1 ). The major
employment center of the region. Research
Triangle Park, and the Raleigh-Durham
International Airport are located in the center of
the "triangle." Malls, sporting events and most
jobs are within an hour's drive of almost any
household in the region. Because Triangle
residents travel between all communities in the
region to take advantage of social, cultural,
employment, and other resources, it makes sense
to use regional approaches to planning and share
the costs and benefits of development.
Figure 1: Regional Traffic Congestion
Source: WML
Purpose and Methodology
This paper argues that the lack of
coordination between localities with land use
decision-making authority and regional agencies
with transportation decision-making power
causes the Triangle region to develop
unsustainable land use patterns and
transportation systems. The purpose of this
paper is to:
suggest general keys to success for
cooperative regional governance
structures;
evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility
ofalternative institutional frameworks for
regional coordination in comparison to the
current land use and transportation
decision-making structures in the
Triangle; and
recommend five institutional changes that
could be adopted separately or in
combination to improve regional
coordination in the Triangle region.
Two sources of opinion, responses to a brief
questionnaire from five regional agencies located
in different parts of the country (Alabama,
California, Illinois/Iowa. North Carolina, and
Oregon) and academic literature on inter-
jurisdictional cooperation, suggest keys to
success and guide the evaluation and
recommendations.
Taking a Regional View
Proponents of regional coordination of land
use and transportation development cite
numerous planning issues that are the result of
the balkanization of local governments within a
region and a lack of concern about the impacts
ofdevelopment and regulation policies on other
jurisdictions (MSRC 1993;Chapralis 1994;
Pincetl 1994; Baldassare, et al. 1996; Leo, et al.
1998; Rusk 2000). Research has identified
several problems that relate specifically to
coordinating land use and transportation between
jurisdictions:
Inefficient regional development
patterns determined by land use choices
made at the local level tend not to support
higher densities in locations that will
optimize the efficiency of regional
transportation systems (Porter 1997:
Rusk 2000).
Inefficient transportation system
leading to poor connectivity between
roads and transit systems across
jurisdictional boundaries. Less direct
transit routes result in fewer
transportation mode choices for residents.
and awkward road connections result in
more air pollution and time spent in traffic
(Porter 1994; Baldassare. et al. 1996).
Individual local development choices
result in greater dispersion ofjobs
throughout a region. Low-skilled jobs
become less accessible to workers with
little money to spend on transportation
(Pincetl 1994; Rusk 2000).
Interstates and other freeways make
"greenfield" sites at the edge of
metropolitan areas accessible and
attractive for development. As a result,
central city lots and buildings that are
served by roads, sewer, utilities, schools,
and other services are abandoned for
these new sites that are not served by
infrastructure and public services and
may be sensitive environmental areas or
productive farmland (Porter 1997).
Critics of regional cooperation state that
there is a lack of concrete evidence linking
political fragmentation to specific problems.
Detractors also point out that larger governments
are inefficient, and that small local governments
provide citizens with increased choice, more
responsiveness and a greater chance for public
input in land use and transportation decisions
(Pincetl 1994; Baldassare. etal. 1996; Porter
1997).
Movement Towards Regional Strategies in
the Triangle
Recent initiatives show that there is
receptiveness towards using regional strategies
to coordinate land use and transportation
decisions in the Triangle. In 1972. the Triangle J
Council ofGovernments (Triangle J COG), one
of 1 8 North Carolina COGs. was formed as a
voluntary organization of municipal and county
governments from the six counties of the region
(Figure 2). The Greater Triangle Regional
Council (GTRC), a coalition ofdevelopers,
environmentalists, fanners, neighborhood
activists, business owners, university
representatives, and chamber of commerce
members from the region, was formed in 1993 to
provide a private perspective on the region's
problems (Warrick 1993). GTRC helped to
develop a series of "smart growth" principles for
the Triangle region (Leavenworth 1999). The
principles include:
Design new and preserve existing
neighborhoods and communities to foster
walkability. safety and a sense of place;
Promote different mixed-use centers of
various scales for each citv, town and
crossroads in the Triangle to serve as
centers of civic, social, cultural, and
economic life, and as transportation hubs;
Create a seamless, regional, multi-modal
transportation system which interlinks
new and existing residential, employment,
commercial, and recreational areas;
Promote development patterns and
designs that take advantage of and
support regional and neighborhood
transportation systems;
Preserve more natural areas and open
space and provide for their
interconnection at local and regional
levels; and
Coordinate land use development and
transportation infrastructure and services
to help achieve each of these principles.
There has also been state support for linking
land use and transportation at the regional level.
The North Carolina Commission to Address
Smart Growth. Growth Management, and
Development Issues ("Smart Growth
Commission") is developing recommendations
that it will present to the state legislature in
January 2001 (Godschalk 2000). One of the
recommendations the Smart Growth Commission
is considering is for the state to allow localities to
voluntarily form regional governments. Under
this arrangement, the voluntary regional
governments will adopt regional smart growth
plans, and if members adopt local smart growth
plans consistent with the regional plan, the
localities in the region could have access to a
"smart growth toolbox" (Stradling 2000). This
would allow Triangle communities to use a series
of state supported smart growth policies, such as
transfer of development rights or impact fees on
new development, without a formal act from the
state legislature. Regions that require
consistency with a regional smart growth plan
would also be eligible for state funded incentives
to implement regional planning efforts. This type
of initiative could result in a regional forum to
unite land use and transportation development
decisions in the Triangle.
Keys to Success for Regional Coordination
of Land Use and Transportation
Modeling regional strategies after successful
regional initiatives in other parts of the country
could help ensure the success of regional
initiatives in the Triangle. Responses from the
five regional agencies and other academic
research suggest there are several critical
elements to creating a regional institutional
structure that fosters integrative decision-making
(Table 1 ). These elements fall under two main
evaluative criteria, feasibility and effectiveness.
A regional structure's effectiveness is the extent
to which the organization is able to get results by
implementing land use and transportation
development tools and decisions. A regional
structure'sfeasibility is the degree of difficulty
in maintaining the necessary institutional
arrangements from political, legal and technical
perspectives. Equity, or the ability of agencies to
include all regional stakeholders in land use and
transportation decisions, is an important
component within this category. Regional
institutions must be equitable in order to maintain
the support of grassroots and other public
interest groups.
The literature shows that regional
governments are most effective when agencies:
Integrate a number of tools to create a
comprehensive regional development
program (Lassar 1991: Leo. et ah 1998):
Establish concrete, understandable,
common goals for communities within the
region (Porter 1997):
^S^s-^WZ
Triangle J Council ofGovernments
(Chatham. Durham. Johnston. Lee.
Orange and Wake Counties)
Figure 2: North Carolina Councils ofGovernment
Source: Land ofSky Regional Council, S'C Councils
ofGovernment
* Establish joint advisory committees to
address land use and transportation
issues:
Promote active communication and
collaboration between jurisdictions: and
Emphasize implementation of plans and
programs.
It also shows that regional initiatives are
most feasible when agencies:
Solicit public involvement in the land use
and transportation process (Carlson and
King 1998):
Take a bottom-up approach to developing
regional plans, work w ith local
jurisdictions as much as possible, and
allow local implementation of regional
strategies (Baldassare. et al. 1996):
Understand traditional institutional
barriers to regional coordination, such as
local home rule authority ( Porter 1 997):
Obtain state support for regional
cooperation (Porter 1997: Carlson and
King 1998): and
Define a clear objective (such as
reduction of regional air pollution,
reduction in regional traffic congestion, or
better management of regional
infrastructure) that requires regional
coordination to be achieved (Chapralis
1 994: Porter 1997).
Current Institutional Arrangements
The Triangle's current institutional structure
has many of the attributes that should lead to
successful regional coordination as mentioned
above. Yet. an alternative institutional
arrangement may be able to achieve greater
effectiveness while maintaining feasibility.
Established Institutional Arrangements
The initiatives of the GTRC and other
proponents of regional cooperation have
promoted this concept within the Triangle's
established institutional framework. However.
these initiatives mav not be successful if the
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current power structure for land use and
transportation decisions remains in place.
Currently, four government agencies
influence regional transportation and land use
planning in the Triangle. Triangle J COG plays a
role in facilitating agreements between localities,
providing data and suggesting principles for land
use and transportation development. The region
has two separate Metropolitan Planning
Organizations, the Capital Area MPO
(CAMPO), which represents areas around
Raleigh, and the Durham-Chapel Hill-Carrboro
MPO (DCHC MPO). Both MPOs have the
power to develop transportation implementation
programs and to distribute state and federal
transportation funds. Finally, the Triangle Transit
Authority has been given the responsibility of
planning and operating a regional transit system.
Despite the existence of these regional
governments, current institutional arrangements
dictate that land use planning and development
decisions remain firmly within the administrative
purview of municipal and county government.
Local governments have the power to:
Develop comprehensive land use plans;
Enact zoning ordinances/establish zoning
districts:
Raise taxes and acquire land; and
Create subdivision and transit-oriented
development guidelines.
In contrast, regional governments play more
of an advisory or clearinghouse role without a
great deal of decision-making power. For
example. TTA has limited power to acquire land
within and around the right-of-way of its future
regional rail corridor. TTA has encouraged local
municipalities to zone a high-density mix of land
uses in areas near future rail stations in its
Station Area Development Guidelines (TTA
1998), yet it can do little if municipalities such as
Cary or Chapel Hill decide to zone areas near
future stations as low-density residential. Hence,
local land use decisions will have a significant
impact on the efficiency of the future rail system
as a whole.
Triangle J COG provides data to
municipalities that may have small staffs or
budgets so that all parts of the region can
achieve a basic level of land use and
transportation planning. Yet, membership in
Triangle J is not mandatory, and localities such as
Siler City and Wilson Mills are not represented.
Under its voluntary structure. Triangle J COG
can:
Mediate land use and transportation
disputes between localities:
Provide land use and transportation data
to all municipalities in the region:
Develop model ordinances for localities;
and
Establish regional land use and
transportation principles.
Finally, while COGs like Triangle J may
develop regional principles, they have no power
to implement their recommendations (Municipal
Cooperation Guide 1993). Therefore, their plans
are often "ignored almost at will by member local
governments" (Porter 1997). For a regional
agency to have true land use and transportation
power, it must be given statutory home rule
powers, there must be an express grant of
powers to the agency through a state
constitutional provision for regional governments,
or there must be specific state or federal
legislation that allows the consolidation of local
municipalities to form regional governments
(Richardson 2000).
Alternative Institutional Arrangements
The Research Triangle could improve
regional coordination of land use and
transportation development by adopting a
different structure of regional governance.
Experiences from other regions in the United
States provide examples of successful inter-
jurisdictional arrangements. Table 1 shows how
the effectiveness and feasibility of regional
initiatives could be affected or improved under
alternative arrangements to the present regional
government structure in the Triangle.
Table 1 describes six regional governance
structures that are currently used in regions of
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Table 1: Institutional Arrangements to Coordinate Land Use and Transportation Planning
Institutional
Arrangement
Potential to Improve Land Use and
Transportation Coordination






Regional councils of governments or
public/private regional organizations
that foster communication or settle
disputes between jurisdictions,
provide data and technical
expertise, and set regional goals
+/- +/-











Agency collects annual dues from all
municipalities in region to hold







Regional Public Service Authority or
Regional Environmental
Conservation Agency providing a
specific service to region, such as
air quality, sewer, airport, or transit
management often have




(Triangle Region); Bay Area
Air Quality Management










Regional transportation agency w ith
land use personnel or developers on
stafE may have power over land use
development in transportation
corridors or near transit stations
+ +/-
Washington D.C. Metropolitan




Agency mandated by federal
legislation to coordinate
transportation planning and allocate
federal and state transportation




MPO or Capital Area MPO
(Triangle Region): MPOs in all






Single government body with
complete land use and
transportation planning, regulation
and implementation control over
entire region; officials may be
elected under state-granted Home
Rule power or appointed from
localities
++ - Portland Metro Council; Twin
Cities Metropolitan Council (f)
Status Quo Institutional Arrangement=land use authority at local level; voluntary regional council of
governments; transportation authority split between two MPOs; one single-purpose transit agency
KEY: =major positive change from status quo for given criterion; ~=minor positive change from status quo for
given criterion; +/- =no improvement or mixed evaluation for given criterion; - =minor negative change from
status quo for given criterion; — =major negative change from status quo for given criterion
SOURCES:
(a) Porter 1992: Atkins 1993; MRSC 1993: Pincetl 1994: Porter 1994: GTRC 1997: Porter 1997; Rusk 2000
(b) GTRC 1997
(c) Lassar 1991; Easley 1992; Porter 1992: Atkins 1993: Chapralis 1994; Pincetl 1994; Baldassare, et al. 1996; Porter 1997
(d)TCRP 1998
(e) Atkins 1993; Pincetl 1994; Rusk 2000
(f) Atkins 1993: Rusk 2000
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the United States. The institutional
arrangements are not mutually exclusive. For
example, the Triangle region has a voluntary
cooperative agreement between local
governments, a single-purpose regional agency,
and two metropolitan planning organizations.
The rating of a regional institution's effectiveness
represents the positive or negative change, in
comparison to the Triangle's current structure of
governance, with respect to the extent to which
the region is able to achieve coordination of land
use and transportation by using regional
development tools. The rating of a regional
institution's feasibility represents the positive or
negative change, in comparison to the Triangle's
current structure of governance, with respect to
the degree of difficulty that the institution will
have implementing land use and transportation
decisions from a political, legal and technical
perspective. The institutional arrangement
ratings are not taken from the perspective of any
ofthe Triangle's regional organizations, local
governments or business or environmental
interests; they are based on evidence that is
presented throughout the paper on the success or
failure of these institutions in other regions of the
United States.
Evaluation of Institutional Arrangements
Currently, the Triangle Region has a
voluntary cooperative arrangement between
local governments (Triangle J COG), a single-
purpose regional agency (TTA). and two
separate MPOs. CAMPO and DCHC MPO.
The effectiveness and feasibility of regional
coordination of land use and transportation may
be improved if one or several of the alternative
institutional arrangements are adopted.
Implementing a more comprehensive regional
strategy may be the best way to coordinate land
use and transportation development in the
Triangle.
Effectiveness and Feasibility
As stated earlier, the effectiveness of an
institutional arrangement is based on the degree
to which the region's governing powers can be
used to coordinate land use and transportation
development. Several agencies in the Triangle
have stated missions to coordinate land use.
transportation or both across the region;
however, land use planning power is currently
held by individual local and county jurisdictions
within the Triangle region. Therefore, an
alternative institutional structure could be more
effective for coordinating land use and
transportation systems.
Based solely on effectiveness, creating a
government agency that would cover a large
geographic area would appear to be an easy
solution to improve coordination of land use and
transportation development in the Triangle
region. Empirically, however, the feasibility of
inter-governmental arrangements tends to
decrease as the size of their jurisdictions
increases. Land use control is a "'ferociously
jealously guarded local power" ( Pincetl 1 994).
Resistance to regional government comes both
from public policy and public sentiment.
There tends to be political support in the
Triangle for the status quo regional institutions.
Moreover, councils ofgovernments like Triangle
J are found in every state and are even needed
to qualify for some state and federal funds, many
regional agencies like TTA are created to
provide public transit service, and MPOs are
mandated federally. Therefore, adopting a new
land use and transportation policy-setting
structure in the Triangle would alter institutions
that are both familiar to residents of the region
and used commonly throughout the nation.
Two main legal obstacles affect the
feasibility of regional governance to coordinate
land use and transportation planning: 1 ) most
state enabling legislation causes land use
planning to be executed at the local government
level, while its impact on transportation corridors
and infrastructure extend across local
boundaries; and 2) federal legislation (i.e.
Transportation Equity Act for the 2
1
il Century -
TEA-2 1 ) mandates that transportation planning
be executed at the regional government level, yet
regional Metropolitan Planning Organizations do
not have the legal power to control land use.
Recommendations
Though each of the following
recommendations could be adopted separately, a
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comprehensive regional strategy may be the
most beneficial for the Triangle region. For
example, a regional sales tax may be most
effective and feasible if it is administered by a
council ofgovernments that all local
governments participate in and which has the
power to require that local land use and
transportation decisions are consistent with a
regional plan.
1. Require Mandatory Membership in the
Triangle J Council of Governments.
The North Carolina General Assembly could
enact a bill requiring that all localities become
members of their COGs. Each municipality
would be charged an annual fee based on its
number of residents. This would provide more
resources to Triangle J and also ensure local
representation on the council and give all
localities and counties in the Triangle a greater
stake in the plans and recommendations of the
regional agency. The Atlanta Regional
Commission (ARC) utilized mandatory
membership and a per capita annual fee to
successfully develop an advisory regional plan
(GTRC 1997). ARC used the annual $0.80 per
capita fee to hold public meetings and gather
input from citizens to develop the plan. Local
planners credited ARC with improv ing
communication among localities and discouraging
development with adverse regional impacts
(GTRC 1997). In the Triangle, fee revenue
could be used to hire more staff, collect and
provide additional data, and facilitate disputes
between municipalities. Though mandatory
membership and an annual fee still would not
allow the cooperative agency to implement and
enforce land use and transportation decisions, it
may provide a greater incentive for localities to
pay attention to the land use and transportation
guidelines provided by Triangle J. Also, because
mandator} participation and annual fee
requirements must be mandated by state
legislation, this act would send a powerful
message to local governments about the
importance of regional coordination.
2. Establish a Land Use Division in the
Triangle Transit Authority that has power
over land use decisions in transit corridors
and station areas.
In anticipation of its Regional Rail Initiative.
TTA could follow the model of the Washington
D.C. Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WAMTA) by establishing a land use division
w ithin the agency. Under this arrangement, TTA
could ensure that land uses within transit
corridors and near transit stations are transit-
supportive. Specifically, by working with local
officials, the agency could encourage higher
density and a better mix of land uses to support
ridership on the regional system. Further, official
corridor and station land use plans could be
created by TTA. or localities could be required to
comply with TTA land use guidelines. These
changes would improve the overall success of
transit in the Triangle region.
WAMTAs land use division develops
advisory land use plans for transit corridors and
areas near transit stations. Although WAMTA
could not establish zoning regulations, itsjoint
land use-development division worked closely
with local jurisdictions to foster appropriate rail
station area development patterns when planning
the Washington regional rail system (TCRP
1 998 ). A similar arrangement could work in the
Triangle region. Ideally, individual localities
would give up some local control over land use
around rail stations so that TTA could establish
mixed use zoning in transit station areas and
corridors and mandate local consistency with
station area development guidelines. However,
even if TTA's land use power was limited, or if
another regional governmental agency was
granted land use authority, a land use division
could advocate for a mix of land uses and
moderate to high residential and commercial
densities developed near stations in Durham.
RTP. Morrisville. Cary. and Raleigh. These land
uses would help support high ridership levels
when trains begin to run in 2007. Unfortunately,
there would most likely be strong political
resistance to TTA having all transit corridor and
station area land use authority.
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3. Merge the Raleigh and Durham MPOs.
With the support of local municipalities, the
two MPOs could be consolidated into one
agency that would coordinate transportation
planning and programming for the entire region.
Under a consolidated MPO. all municipalities
within the Triangle would be able to work with a
single organization towards a single regional
vision. Ideally, this would result in the funding of
projects that extend beyond current jurisdictional
boundaries to the region as a whole, such as
transit connections between Raleigh and
Durham.
The Bi-State Regional Planning Commission
operating in the Quad Cities region has
jurisdiction over four distinct cities, Davenport,
IA. Bettendorf, IA, Rock Island. IL, and Moline.
IL. The commission transcends municipal,
federal and geographic boundaries to serve
communities on both sides of the Mississippi
River. Like these residents of Iowa and Illinois,
who make a large number of trips among the
Quad Cities, residents ofChapel Hill and
Durham make a large number of commuting and
social trips to Cary and Raleigh and vice versa.
Therefore, a single MPO arrangement might also
be effective in the Triangle.
Combining the two MPOs is legally feasible
because the state legislature has already passed
a law to allow the Durham and Raleigh planning
organizations to merge. CAMPO. however,
opposed the merger ( The Chapel Hill News, II
1 2/00). possibly out ofconcern that local
interests would not be represented by a larger
agency. For example. Chapel Hill may have less
power to receive funding for sidewalk
improvements and its system of bikeways if the
MPO must also address the needs of towns like
Cary and Smithfield.
4. Give the Triangle J Council of
Governments authority over land use and
transportation development.
If the state legislature and the governor are
persuaded by the North Carolina Smart Growth
Commission to enact legislation that would
require or allow the formation of regional
agencies. Triangle J COG could obtain authority
over land use and transportation development.
The agency would be able to create a smart
growth plan and require that localities comply
with its land use and transportation development
provisions or develop a negotiated process of
cross-acceptance (Godschalk 2000). With this
structure in place. Triangle J would receive
incentives for creating plans, and localities in the
region could levy impact fees on new
developments, set up tax increment financing
districts, or establish transfer ofdevelopment
rights programs.
Modeled after the Portland Metro Council
and Twin Cities (Minneapolis-St. Paul)
Metropolitan Council, this type of regional body
(with supporting state legislation) could
coordinate its regional land use plans with the
regional transportation system and in effect
oversee the Durham and Raleigh MPOs and
TTA. The agency would not only be able to
achieve the land use and transportation
coordination goals lobbied for by the Greater
Triangle Regional Council, it could also:
Establish a regional tax or mandate
regional cost-sharing;
Adopt regional zoning ordinances to
establish minimum and maximum
development density, mixed land uses,
and transit-oriented or traditional
neighborhoods;
Write subdivision and transit-oriented
development regulations to require
facilities for walking and bicycling;
Acquire land for public buildings and
public right-of-way;
Review developments of regional impact
and plan and site regional public facilities;
Establish an urban growth boundary; and
Levy bonds to provide infrastructure in
transit corridors or provide tax incentives
for businesses to locate near transit
corridors or hubs.
The Twin Cities Metro Council mandated
that the plans of all 189 cities and towns in the
region be consistent with its regional systems
plans (Lassar 1991 ). As a result, it has been
credited with guiding 93 percent of development
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in the region between 1 980 and 1 990 to areas
designated in its comprehensive plan, saving $1
billion in infrastructure costs (GTRC 1997).
Portland used its regional zoning authority to set
minimum density targets of four to ten dwelling
units per acre for all 27 of its municipalities
(Porter 1 997). Similarly, King County, WA
proposed a measure that would require a
minimum of 1 5.000 jobs to be contained within
one-half mile of 14 high-density urban centers in
order to support its transit system. Opposition
surfaced, however, when projections showed
that the transit system would reduce traffic by
only two percent (Porter 1994).
Regional authority over land use decisions
would most likely come from the state
legislature. As shown by the success of the
agencies in Portland and the Twin Cities, regional
cooperation mandated by state statute may be
the most legally and politically feasible way to
create an effective growth management program
(Porter 1997; Rusk 2000). Though
municipalities may resent this top-down
approach, a statutory mandate could help counter
opposition from local proponents ofhome rule
authority. Thirteen states, including Florida,
Georgia and Tennessee, have statewide growth
management laws that integrate transportation
and land use planning and development
(Godschalk 2000). Recommendations of the
Smart Growth Commission may persuade
Raleigh lawmakers to enact legislation that
would allow a regional coordinating body with
similar powers to be created in the Triangle.
In California, the Joint Exercise of Powers
Act (California Government Code Section 6500-
6599. 1 ) allows two or more public agencies to
"jointly exercise any power common to the
contracting parties." The legislation permits the
creation of new government entities and can give
regional agencies powers such as the authority to
issue revenue bonds to pay for streets, roads,
bridges, or mass transit facilities and vehicles
(Carlson and King 1998). A similar act of the
North Carolina General Assembly could provide
these development management tools to a
regional government in the Triangle.
Formal regional governance powers are
more difficult to establish. Local officials may
not be willing to cede a regional group control
over decisions that could keep them from
implementing some of their own plans. For
example, though the review of developments of
regional impact (DRI) is required in the Twin
Cities and Atlanta, local governments resisted
DRI review in Palm Beach County. FL, leading
to the demise of the Palm Beach Countywide
Regional Council (Porter 1997). When regional
governance was proposed in San Francisco,
some anti-growth groups perceived that regional
authority w ould undermine their grassroots
support. At the same time, proponents of growth
thought that taking power away from local
governments would reduce the number of sites
open for development within the region (Porter
1997). Even within the area covered by the
successful Twin Cities Metro Council. 90 percent
of localities were opposed to the idea of regional
governance when it was first proposed.
Other political obstacles to establishing
governments that cover wide geographic areas
include the fact that suburban voters traditionally
oppose regional governments, as well as federal
funding cuts to regional agencies in the early
1980s. Regional governments" power to use land
use and transportation management tools may
also be impeded by the political climate. For
example, municipalities in the Twin Cities region
may begin to lobby against tax-sharing if they
see excessive revenue losses. And although
Portland Metro's home rule powers include
taxing authority, the agency has not used the
power to date because of the negative public
attitude toward taxes (Steele 2000). Opposition
to regional authority is found in the Triangle as
well. Steve Ford, staff writer for The Raleigh
News and Observer, commented. "Our counties,
and in some cases towns within those counties,
are still too competitive and jealous of local
prerogatives to agree to cede real power to a
regional body" (Ford 1999). Regional bodies are
perceived by residents and localities to have a
more difficult time providing information to. and
addressing the concerns of. individual citizens
than local governments (Pincetl 1994; Porter
1997).
Yet, when development and infrastructure
are planned poorly and the public perceives a
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crisis, regional governance becomes more
politically feasible. Environmental protection and
local growth regulation are now high-profile
issues in metropolitan areas. Because of traffic
congestion, automobile pollution, and a projected
$10 billion funding shortfall for new freeways,
secondary roads, mass transit, high occupancy
vehicle lanes, and pedestrian and bicycle
facilities over the next 25 to 50 years (Stradling
2000). many Triangle residents and business
leaders, as well as the mayors of Cary. Chapel
Hill and Durham, support a regional tax for
transportation improvements. Though a majority
of the members of the Raleigh Chamber of
Commerce do not support increased taxes, the
leaders of the Chamber would support new local
taxes that could help relieve traffic (Stradling
2000). Precedent for regional taxation in the
Triangle was set when TTA established a five
percent tax on car rentals in Durham, Orange
and Wake Counties in 1 997 that generates $6
million per year. A regional sales tax would
allow greater funding of a coordinated, region-
wide transportation system (Hyman 2000).
Several other programs have overcome
business and citizen concerns. In the New
Jersey Pinelands. a transfer of development
rights program administered by a regional
government has been successful in protecting
environmentally sensitive lands while focusing
higher-density development in areas with high
transportation accessibility (Porter 1997). The
Atlanta Regional Commission and Twin Cities
Metropolitan Planning Commission use their
power to review DRIs to ensure that local
projects do not have an adverse impact on the
region as a whole (GTRC 1997). Though the
public and developers in these regions worried
that the development process would be hindered
by additional reviews, the new Commission's
existence seems to be an effective incentive for
developers to think regionally. To date, no
projects have been delayed in the Twin Cities
(Lassar 1991).
Portland has successfully adopted
subdiv ision guidelines requiring pedestrian and
bicycle facilities and the establishment of
minimum standards for transportation
performance throughout the region (Porter
1 997). Finally, the New Jersey Pinelands and
Twin Cities have both been able to create tax
incentives for businesses to locate near transit
hubs (GTRC 1997; Porter 1997). These are
some of the tools that would be possible under a
regional framework in the Triangle.
5. Levy Regional Sales Tax to be
Administered by Triangle J Council of
Governments.
If TTA and the two MPOs were contained
within Triangle J. the agency could be given the
authority to administer a regional sales tax. The
Regional Transportation Alliance, a group of
business and government leaders organized by
the Greater Raleigh Chamber of Commerce, and
the mayors of Cary, Chapel Hill and Durham will
lobby the state legislature in January 2001 to
allow the region to vote on this type of tax. A
regional sales tax could help fund transit planning
and improvements, such as TTA*s Regional Rail
Initiative, station area plans, bus shelters, and
land acquisition in transit corridors. It could also
provide funding for highway, sidewalk and
bicycle system construction and maintenance
throughout the Triangle region.
The RTA has also given its support to
GTRC*s efforts to establish a regional land use
strategy and transportation initiatives. Policies
backed by the RTA include merging the Durham
and Raleigh MPOs. implementing TTVs
Regional Rail Initiative, and encouraging the
state to allow the region and localities to increase
transit funding through a regional 5-cent gas tax
or local sales tax. According to the Institute for
Transportation Research and Education at North
Carolina State University, sales taxes could raise
$65 million annually for the region (Paik 1999).
The local sales tax initiative follows the
model of Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, where
legislation allowed the region's voters to approve
a sales tax that raises $1 million per week for
mass transit (Hyman 2000). A regional body
with taxing authority in the Triangle would
provide the region with more transit funding than
is currently available for the entire state (the
legislature has capped NC DOT statewide
transit funding at $5 million annually). The tax
would also allow residents ofChapel Hill and
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Cary to help pay for roads that they use when
visiting Durham and Raleigh.
Yet. the feasibility of taxation remains in
question. While leaders of the Raleigh Chamber
of Commerce support the 0.5 percent tax. they
have stopped promoting it aggressively because
only 37 percent of the Chamber's 5000 members
support the tax (Stradling 2000). The region may
look to the Twin Cities for an example of a
regional tax-sharing program. As a result of this
Metro Council initiative. 40 percent of the
commercial and industrial tax base of each
municipality goes to a regional pool of funds,
which helps subsidize infrastructure costs for
poorer municipalities. Without the tax-sharing
program, the per capita tax disparity would have
been 50:1; with tax-sharing, it was only 12:1
(GTRC 1997).
The mayors of Can. Chapel Hill and
Durham also support a region-wide, multi-modal
transportation plan. According to The Chapel
Hill News, "current planning activity is focused
either on a single part of the Triangle, the
separate Capitol and Durham-Chapel Hill
planning organizations, or on distinct modes of
transportation... Nowhere is there in place a
region-wide, multi-modal transportation plan.
That's what the mayors want" ( The Chapel Hill
News, 7/12/00).
Further Support for Regional Solutions
Public support for regional governments is
often easier to come by if the organization
created focuses on a concrete, narrow regional
goal, such as water quality protection, transit
provision, or park system management
(Belldassare. et al. 1996: Porter 1997). For
instance, many Triangle residents perceive that
traffic congestion and air pollution reduce the
quality of life and viability of businesses in the
region (Hicks 1995: Ford 1999: Dyer and
Feagans 2000). In 1993. columnist Neal Price
cited "longer commuting times, pockets of ugly
and mounting traffic congestion, and air pollution
high enough to trigger ozone alert days" as
negative results of the Triangle's fragmented
leadership (Warrick 1993). These problems
have helped build support for the recent regional
development management strategy proposals of
the GTRC. RTA. and the mayors of Cary.
Chapel Hill and Durham. Yet. further support for
regional cooperation may not be generated if
planners and policy-makers at Triangle J COG
TTA, the Durham and Raleigh MPOs, and local
and county governments do not connect what
Triangle residents consider critical issues to the
inefficient results of local land use authority and
regional transportation control.
Between 1950 and 1990. the urbanized
population of the Triangle grew less than 300
percent, while the total urbanized area grew by
900 percent ( Whisnant 2000). Connecting the
local land use decisions that have fostered this
lower-density, non-contiguous growth to the
regional problems of traffic congestion and
automobile pollution can help rally public support
for cooperative regional solutions. For example,
planners can present concrete data, such as the
number of extra automobile trips that are needed
for residents ofApex or Hillsborough living in
neighborhoods that are not served by public
transit or are not within walking distance of
commercial centers. In addition, planners can
provide information about how much work and
family time is lost to commuting when a
residence is located five, ten or twenty miles
from an employment center. They can also
explain how much additional carbon monoxide.
h\ drocarbon or ozone pollution is created by
these trips. Summing emissions increases,
additional commuting expenses, decreases in
transit ridership. losses of exercise, and time lost
over the entire region can be used as a powerful
example of the public costs generated by
uncoordinated transportation decisions.
Between 1 990 and 2020. the population of
the Triangle is projected to increase 76 percent,
from 700.000 to 1 .230.000 ( Eisenstadt and Hoar
1995). This growth will be accommodated more
efficiently if land use and transportation systems
are coordinated over the entire region. If a
regional body is dedicated specifically to address
issues of traffic congestion and automobile
pollution in the Triangle, it may build credibility
through small successes. With this credibility, it
may be able to obtain broader powers to




Evidence from other parts of the country
reveals the strengths and weaknesses of multi-
jurisdictional cooperation and suggests keys to
success for regional coordination of land use and
transportation development. Evaluating the
effectiveness and feasibility of alternative
institutional frameworks in the Triangle region
demonstrates that land use and transportation
coordination could be improved by adopting
alternative government arrangements. This
paper recommends five specific institutional
changes in order to achieve regional gains: 1
)
merge the Raleigh and Durham MPOs; 2)
require mandatory membership in the Triangle J
Council of Governments; 3) establish a Land
Use Division within the Triangle Transit
Authority with power over land use decisions
near transit corridors and stations; 4) give the
Triangle J Council ofGovernments authority over
land use and transportation development; and 5)
levy a regional sales tax to be administered by
Triangle J COG.
Sandy Ogburn suggests that the Triangle has
made progress toward taking this kind of regional
view. The Triangle hosted a World Class Region
Conference in 1987. which eventually inspired
the creation ofTTA and GTRC. Within the past
five years, there has been renewed interest in
regional planning strategies. "Right now the
mayors are interested and the business
community is interested." says Ogburn. But
significant shifts in attitudes still must be made:
"Although the rest of the world views us as a
region, individually we do not view ourselves as a
region. Not working as a region impedes sitting
at the table and working through problems
together." Adopting an institutional structure that
fosters coordinated land use and transportation
systems at the regional level can ensure that the
quality of life in the Triangle region remains as
high as it was when Sandy Ogburn first moved
here 25 years ago.©
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Statewide Inclusionary Land Use Laws and
Suburban Exclusion
Spencer M. Cowan
There is little, if any. dispute over the need
for more low- or moderately-priced 1 housing, nor
is there much disagreement that the shortage of
such housing is more severe in newer suburbs
than in central cities and older, inner-ring
suburbs. One way of addressing those situations
is through inclusionary land use rules that make
the production of lower-priced housing an
integral part of residential and/or commercial
development. These rules are intended to
increase the supply of low-priced housing and
reduce its increasing concentration in existing
areas of poverty.
All inclusionary programs present a trade-off
for the de\ eloper. For projects subject to the
inclusionary rules, the developer bears the
burden of providing some affordable units
( inclusionary units) as a condition for receiving
development permits. In return, the developer
receives benefits to offset that burden. : These
benefits almost always will include a density
bonus; that is. the developer will be allowed to
build more units (bonus units) than would have
been allowed in the absence of the inclusionary
rules. The bonus units can then be sold or rented
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at market prices. In addition, the inclusionary
rules may allow or mandate other cost saving
incentives to help defray the additional expense
of providing the inclusionary units ( Smith et al.
1996; Mallach 1984). The intended result is an
increase in the supply of lower-priced housing, 3
financed mostly by the added profit generated by
the bonus units ( Dietderich 1 996). In theory, no
direct public funding is required. 4
Inclusionary rules may be adopted by an
individual municipality^ as local regulations
(locally-adopted).'
1
or they may be enacted at the
state level
7
as part of the general laws and state
regulations (statewide)/ Some statewide plans
specify the essential program elements (state-
designed).
1
' while others require municipalities to
accommodate housing for lower-income families
but let local government determine the operating
details of the program to accomplish that goal
(locally-designed)."' Some municipalities in
states with statewide programs have also
adopted their own local plans with provisions
different from, but not inconsistent with, the
state's;" statewide and locally-adopted plans are
not mutually exclusive.
This article will discuss: 1 ) the beliefs
underlying statewide inclusionary programs, to
show which aspects of the problem of suburban
exclusion they are trying to address, and 2) the
characteristics of five existing statewide
programs, to highlight the similarities and
differences among them. While statewide, the
programs in California and New Jersey are
locally-designed and exhibit many of the same
operational elements as locally-adopted plans,
such as the one in Montgomery County.
Mary land. The programs in Connecticut.
Massachusetts and Rhode Island are all state-
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designed and offer a distinctly different
approach.
Suburban Exclusion and Statewide Plans
The essential difference between statewide
and locally-adopted inclusionary plans is in the
basic theory underlying the two classes of
programs. Locally-adopted programs are based
on the premise that the scarcity of affordable
housing in a community is due to the
unwillingness of developers to produce such
housing. Therefore, municipalities must compel
developers to build affordable units as a
condition of getting approvals for the larger
project. Statewide programs, on the other hand,
are based on the theory that the scarcity of
lower-priced housing is. at least partially, the
deliberate and/or inadvertent result of local land
use and development regulations. Lower-priced
housing is being excluded (Dietderich 1 996:
Davidoff et al. 1971 ). Therefore, the state must
either prevent municipalities from using their
power to exclude, or compel them to accept
some affordable housing through regional or
statewide allocation.
The connection between local land use
ordinances and exclusion is a widely-noted
phenomenon (Pendall 2000: Farley et al. 1993).
and the reasons offered to explain why that may
be so are also numerous. Rolleston (1987) finds
three reasons why municipalities adopt the kinds
of land use regulations that they do: fiscal
concerns, reduction of negative externalities and
discrimination. The first two are consistent with
arguments that suburban exclusion may be an
unintended side-effect of legitimate local actions
to address community concerns (Mueller 1 989;
Fischel 1985). All three are consistent with
explanations ofwhy local government might,
affirmatively, want to exclude the poor
(Dietderich 1996: Briffault 1990).
The fiscal concerns are based on the desire
of local officials to provide the highest possible
level of local services at the lowest cost to
residents. Since most municipal revenue is from
local property taxes, this objective may be
accomplished by permitting only those units that
will contribute more than their ratable share of
property taxes for the existing level of services
(Mueller 1989;Tiebout 1956). That means that
rationally, local government should only permit
relatively more expensiv e residential
development, excluding the poor who probably
will require more in locally-funded services than
they pay in property taxes.
Two commonly identified negative
externalities ofdevelopment that local regulations
seek to prevent are traffic congestion and
decreasing property values ofexisting housing
(Dietderich 1996; Rolleston 1987). Both are
associated, whetherjustifiably or not. with the
increased density and multi-family units that may
be necessary to produce lower-priced units
(Pozdena 19*87; Ellickson 1981). Local
government can. therefore, rationally conclude
that more widely scattered, single-family housing
will help avoid those negative externalities and
zone accordingly. 12 Because large-lot single-
family housing is relatively expensive to produce,
the poor are excluded.
A community that wants to exclude
minorities and the poor or that does not want
affordable housing built within itsjurisdiction can.
easily and with legally sufficient reasons, adopt
zoning and subdivision regulations that make the
development of affordable housing economically
impossible (Dietderich 1996; Davidoff etal.
1971: Babcock 1966). Although Buchanan v.
Warley 1 - prevents local government from
explicitly discriminating based on race, local
government is allowed to discriminate based on
wealth. 14 and. given the correlation between
wealth and race in this country, that achieves
substantially the same end result. Under the
guise of protecting the general welfare or
preserving property values. 1 - a municipality can
limit new housing to single-family units on large
lots. It can impose infrastructure requirements
that drive the cost of subdivision out of the range
of affordability. It can. through hurdles and
delays in the permitting process, make it clear to
prospective developers that they will not gain
approval, within time and cost parameters that
allow any chance of financial viability, for
projects seeking to create lower-priced housing
(Lugeret al. 1997; NIMBY Report 1991).
Because all of these local government actions
drive up the price of housing, they effectively
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keep out the poor and minorities, even if that is
not what was intended (Luger et al 1997; Lowry
etal. 1990; Johnston etal. 1984; Seidel 1978). If
it is what was intended, the law will still accept
the proffered reasons as sufficient to justify the
local actions.
Statewide inclusionary programs are a direct
response to perceived suburban exclusion
(108HLR1 127 1995;Breagy 1976). In these
programs, the state, as sovereign, steps in to limit
municipalities" power to exclude and/or compel
them to permit some affordable housing. There
are two ways that states have done this. In one
approach, used in New England, the state has
directly limited local power and imposed a
complete inclusionary system on its constituent
municipalities so that all operate under exactly
the same rules. The other approach, used in
California and New Jersey, compels
municipalities to accept a "fair share" of regional
affordable housing needs but gives local
governments flexibility in meeting that
responsibility. Municipalities are required to plan
for their regional allocation of affordable housing,
and the state provides for sanctions for failure to
comply."1 That strategy has led to a variety of
local tactics, including inclusionary programs.
Because each plan is locally-designed, there is
substantial variation in the operational details
among the various local programs, with many
quite similar to the Moderately Priced Dwelling
Unit ordinance in Montgomery County.
Maryland.
Whether the plan is state- or locally-
designed, review and approval of development
proposals remains at the local level. The rules
for the permitting process may be modified, but
local boards still have the responsibility for and
power over the initial project approvals ( Lohe
2000). The statewide program is not one in
which the state takes over local government's
role in deciding how development should occur.
Program Participation - Mandatory or
Voluntary
One of the most fundamental differences
between the two statewide systems is how any
given municipality's program determines whether
a specific development proposal will be governed
by the inclusionary rules. The rules may require
developer participation (mandatory program), or
developers may be allowed to choose whether to
have the inclusionary rules apply ( voluntary
program).
Most locally-designed plans, including
approximately 90% of plans in California, are
mandatory (Burchell et al. 1994). although there
are exceptions. 17 This may reflect local officials'
belief that developer choices are the reason for
the shortage of lower-priced housing in their
community. 18 The three statewide, state-
designed programs in New England are all
voluntary. Those programs operate on the
premise that local government exclusion is the
dominant reason for the scarcity of lower-priced
housing in the suburbs and that developers will
produce more of it if they are not hindered by
local government (Herr 2000; Stockman 1992).
The New Jersey program, as initially created
by the state's Supreme Court in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel 1 " {Mount Laurel I) and Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
LaureP {Mount Laurel II), was a voluntary
plan. It originated with Mount Laurel /. where
the Court found that the local government was
excluding and ordered it to stop. Eight years
later, in Mount Laurel II, the Court found that
the same township was still "afflicted with a
blatantly exclusionary ordinance."' 21 At that
point, the Court created a "builder's remedy""
that allowed developers to seek permits in court
for inclusionary development. In response to
local governments" complaints about the impact
of the builder's remedy, the state legislature
created a statewide program, superceding the
Court's program, that has allowed municipalities
to adopt mandatory inclusionary regulations and
avoid the builder's remedy (Burchell et al. 1994;
Mandelker 1990)."
Mandatory programs typically require a
project to be inclusionary if it is over a threshold
size. Commonly, that threshold is based upon the
number of units in the proposed development,
although that is not the only possibility. The
program may exempt some types of residential
developments, such as projects that create rental
units. Commercial development may also be
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subject to inclusionary requirements, with the
threshold based on the number of square feet,
prospective employees, or some other
quantifiable basis (Burchell etal. 1994;
Mandelker 1990: Mallach 1984; Ellickson
1981).
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Voluntary programs induce participation by
offering sufficiently large incentives to make
development under the inclusionary rules more
attractive than under the regulations that would
otherwise apply to the project. Instead of
determining when a project must be inclusionary.
voluntary programs have criteria to establish
whether a project or developer may be eligible
for those benefits. The rules may require a
minimum percentage of affordable units as a
condition of participation, and they may restrict
eligibility by prohibiting for-profit developers, as
is done in Massachusetts24 and, under some
circumstances, in Rhode Island. ;s In addition,
the programs all are self-limiting to prevent
developers from overwhelming any single
municipality with affordable units or excessive
density. Projects are not eligible in any
municipality that meets statutory threshold
criteria, such as having 10 percent or more of its
housing stock subsidized.
Basic Program Elements
The basic elements of an inclusionary
program establish the quid pro quo of the trade.
They determine: 1 ) how many inclusionary units
the developer must produce; 2) how much of a
density bonus he or she will receive; and 3) other
cost-saving incentives that may be included in
the bargain as additional compensation for the
inclusionary units.
Set-aside Requirement
The first part of the trade the program must
specify is the percentage of inclusionary units, or
set-aside requirement. The California and New
Jersey programs use regional or state authorities
to determine regional housing needs and allocate
a "fair share" of those to each municipality,
which may then impose sufficient set-asides on
new development to attain that "fair share."
Because the program details are specified
locally, the set-aside requirements may vary from
one municipality to the next. In California, most
of the programs require a set-aside of between
1 and 1 5 percent of the total number of units in
the project, although the actual set-asides range
from 5 to 35 percent (Burchell et al. 1994).
The New England voluntary programs
establish the set-aside percentage as the
condition of eligibility for the density bonuses and
other incentives of the program. In
Massachusetts, for example, only projects
providing 25 to 30 percent affordable units may
proceed under the inclusionary rules, while
Connecticut requires 20 percent for some
classes of projects (Burchell et al. 1994;
Stockman 1992).
Density Bonus
Closely linked to the set-aside requirement is
the extent of allowable density bonus. The
higher the set-aside, the greater the density
bonus must be to compensate for the cost of the
inclusionary units, all other things being equal. 20
For mandatory programs, the additional units
must adequately compensate the developer for
the cost of producing the inclusionary units to
avoid two possible negative consequences. If
the bonus is not sufficient, the regulations could
be found to be a taking, or developers may
decide to build where their profits are not so
adversely affected (Dietderich 1996: Mandelker
1990; Ellickson 1981). The latter is less of a
factor if the inclusionary requirements are
regionally uniform because developers will find it
harder to move to avoid them and still serve the
same target housing market. 27 Most mandatory
programs establish the number of bonus units as
a function of the number of inclusionary units
required, allowing X bonus units for every
inclusionary unit (Dietderich 1996).
For voluntary programs, the density bonus
has to be enough to make inclusionary
development preferable to proceeding under the
otherwise applicable rules (Dietderich 1996:
Stockman 1992). The three statewide voluntary
programs in New England all allow the developer
to determine the extent of density bonus
necessary to make the project economically
viable, considering the set-aside required for
program participation.
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Only in California do municipalities have the
option of not allowing a density bonus. One of
the California state laws mandating local
inclusionary plans requires communities to "grant
density or other bonuses" (Burchell et al. 1994:
1 59), while another speaks of "•regulatory
concessions and incentives'" (Burchell et al.
1994: 159). That statutory language would
appear to give communities the option of
requiring inclusionary units without permitting
bonus units, although other cost saving incentives
are then required.
Additional Cost Saving Incentives
Finally, the program may identify additional
or alternative cost saving incentives that may be
allowed for inclusionary developments.
Typically, those include reduced infrastructure,
expedited permitting, fee waivers, or other
exemptions from locally adopted regulatory
requirements, all ofwhich are potentially
available under all five statewide programs.
Because voluntary plans rely on incentives to
induce participation, they are generally more
flexible and offer the potential for a wider array
of incentives than mandatory plans.
In offering other cost-saving incentives,
statewide plans have substantially more flexibility
than locally-adopted programs. A locally-
adopted plan is limited by the extent of the local
government's power. It can only change local
rules. The state, however, in adopting a
statewide plan, can offer additional incentives in
the form of exemption from or specific benefits
in state laws or regulations.
Neither California nor New Jersey make
significant use of that possibility for the locally-
designed mandatory programs adopted by their
municipalities. The builder's remedy in New
Jersey appears to give substantial benefit to
developers, but only, in effect, in communities
that do not have COAH-certifled housing
elements. The California DHCD may withhold
discretionary funding from a municipality if its
housing element does not comply with state
requirements (Burchell etal. 1994: Mandelker
1990). That may not directly save costs for the
developer of an inclusionary project, but it may
provide him or her with additional leverage in
negotiating for local permits. :s
All three statewide voluntary programs make
more extensive use of the ability to provide
incentives through changes in state law. One
common strategy is to reduce the time, expense
and uncertainty in the permitting process, a major
concern for developers (Luger et al. 1997).
Both Massachusetts and Rhode Island offer
inclusionary proposals through a unitary
permitting process, eliminating the need for
multiple local approvals. In both states, the
application goes to the local zoning board, which,
by statute, may grant whatever special
exemptions or variances from pre-existing local
regulations may be necessary for the project to
proceed and issue the permit. :" This saves
developers the time and expense of appearing
before several different town boards and
reduces the opportunity for opponents to delay
the project with appeals of each separate
approval. In addition, Massachusetts specifies
an accelerated schedule for hearing and
rendering a decision on the initial application for
inclusionary proposals, further reducing the time
needed. If the board fails to act within the time
allowed, either to open the hearing or render a
final decision, the permit is automatically granted
(Stockman 1992)/"
Beyond the limited preemption of local
regulations through the broad powers granted to
the local zoning board in the unitary permitting
process, all three statewide voluntary plans
provide for a substantially more developer-
friendly appeals process. In Massachusetts and
Rhode Island, inclusionary developments may
take an expedited appeal of unfavorable local
decisions to a special administrative agency, the
Housing Appeals Commission (HAC) in
Massachusetts and the Housing Appeals Board
(HAB) in Rhode Island. In Connecticut, the
appeal goes to a specially designated court on an
expedited calendar. In all three New England
states, the municipality has the burden of proving
on appeal that its decision was justified. This is a
reversal of the ordinary situation, in which local
decisions are accorded a presumption of
validity,'
1 and the developer would have to prove
that there was not "rational or reasonable basis"
for the decision, that it was "clearly erroneous."
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or that it was "arbitrary and capricious."32
Municipalities are more limited in the reasons
they may use to sustain an unfavorable decision
on appeal than those that would generally apply
to local regulatory decisions. While the exact
statutory language varies among the three states,
the common element is that protecting the
"general welfare" is not sufficient. To sustain an
adverse local decision, in both Connecticut and
Massachusetts, the appellate board must find
that the public interests justifying the decision
outweigh the need for affordable housing. In
Rhode Island, the board must find that the
decision was "both "reasonable" and "consistent
with local needs" as expressed in the locality's
comprehensive plan and zoning requirements""
(Burchelletal. 1994: 146).
The impact of these changes is to increase
the developer's chances of getting local approval
or prevailing on appeal of an unfavorable local
decision. In Massachusetts, between 1969 and
1 986-7. there were 458 applications under the
state's inclusionary program. Of those. 238
were granted without conditions. 89 with
conditions and 1 3 1 denied at the local level. Of
the 220 applications not granted unconditional
approval. 200 appealed to the HAC. Of those.
20 dropped the appeal before the HAC could
render its decision, leaving 1 80 applications. The
HAC upheld the local denial in only 10 of those
cases. In 70 cases, the board reversed the local
decision, and in 1 00 the parties settled and the
permit was issued as agreed. Therefore, of the
original 458 applications to build affordable
housing. 408 received permits, and the
developers who pursued their appeals to a
decision by the HAC received a permit in 1 70 of
1 80 cases (Burchell et al. 1994; Stockman
1992).
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In Connecticut, as of the end of 1998.
there had been 36 court cases filed involving 28
developments resolved on the merits of the case.
The applicant prevailed in 28 of those cases
involving 2 1 developments. In addition, courts
rejected 4 cases in which an abutter appealed a
local approval (Hollister 1999).
Finally, the Massachusetts and Rhode Island
laws provide for a "builder"s remedy.'" allowing
the appellate authority to actually issue the
permit. This saves the developer the time and
expense of going back in front of the same local
authorities who rendered the initially unfavorable
decision. It also deprives those authorities of the




Programs, both mandatory and voluntary,
usually specify the target price or rent for the
inclusionary units. 34 All five programs set the
price level based on income. In California, the
state compels municipalities to plan, through the
required housing element, for the needs of
households from very-low- through moderate-
income. Locally-designed plans vary from
targeting very-low- and low-income households
only, all the way to including moderate-income
units. New Jersey allocates the ""fair share" of
the regional needs of very-low- and low-income
households to each municipality, though the local
inclusionary regulations adopted to satisfy that
allocated share may include higher incomes as
well (Wish et al. 1 997; Burchell et al. 1 994).
Connecticut only allows low-income housing to
qualify for its program, while Massachusetts and
Rhode Island include moderate-income
households in their programs (Stockman 1992).
Affordab ility Covenants
Neither of the statewide mandatory
programs sets a specific limit on the length of
time that the inclusionary units must remain
affordable. One complaint about the earliest
local programs in California was that the units
only had to remain affordable for one year, after
which they could be sold at fair market value
(Ellickson 1981). However, since the system
requires each municipality to provide its '"fair
share" of affordable housing, it is in the
municipality's interest to ensure that the units
contribute for as long as possible, with
restrictions lasting from five years to perpetuity
(Burchelletal. 1994).
Two of the statewide voluntary programs do
require that the inclusionary units remain
affordable for a minimum period of time, at least
in some cases. In Rhode Island, inclusionary
units in developments by for-profits must remain
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affordable for at least 30 years. There are no
time limits on units in projects by government
agencies or non-profit organizations.
Connecticut requires a minimum 20-year
restriction (Burchell et al. 1994). Massachusetts
imposes no time limit within its program but limits
participation to government agencies, non-profits
and limited dividend corporations, reducing the
probability that the developer will be unwilling to
negotiate substantial affordability protection as
part of the permit.
In addition to any internal requirements in
either kind of inclusionary program, there may be
additional or more stringent affordability
restrictions imposed by external funding sources.
For example, some inclusionary projects in
Massachusetts receive tax-exempt bond
financing through state programs to increase the
supply of rental housing. That program
requires that 40 percent of the units be
affordable by households with incomes less than
60 percent of median, or that 20 percent be
affordable by households with incomes less than
50 percent of median, and they must remain
affordable for a minimum of 1 5 years (Stockman
1992).
Clustering, Off-site. Out-of-town, and
Payments In Lieu
Inclusionary developments under four of the
statewide plans are not necessarily required to
integrate the inclusionary units into the larger
project. Developers may be allowed to cluster
those units in one area, creating a small section
of affordable units separated from the more
expensive market portion of the project. Both
California and New Jersey allow locally-
designed programs to condone this practice, and
neither Connecticut nor Rhode Island prohibit it.
Of the state-designed programs, only
Massachusetts has regulations against clustering,
specifically requiring that the inclusionary units
be spread ratably through the project.
Under both the California and New Jersey
laws, locally-designed plans may allow the
developer to provide the inclusionary units off-
site, giving credit for units in other developments.
Developers can create one project of exclusively
market housing and another, at a different
location, with the inclusionary units that would
have been required for the market project. All
three state-designed plans in New England
require that the inclusionary units be built within
the same development.
New Jersey goes so far as to permit
developers to provide up to halfof all required
inclusionary units in a different city or town
through regional contribution agreements. This
allows suburban developers to build inclusionary
units in older urban areas to satisfy part of the
suburban "fair share" requirement. Some critics
have noted that this policy may work against the
goal of increasing housing opportunities in the
suburbs for lower-income households (Payne
1996).
For locally-designed plans in California and
New Jersey, where participation is mandatory,
the program may allow some developers, usually
for smaller projects or those for which additional
density cannot adequately compensate, to make
a payment in lieu instead of actually producing
the inclusionary units. The money is placed in a
fund that is then used to finance affordable
housing.
Impact of Statewide Inclusionary Programs
One of the most obvious advantages of a
statewide inclusionary program is that it can
address the problem of exclusion. Reliance on
locally-adopted plans cannot. Whether locally-
or state-designed, the statewide approach
ensures that all municipalities have inclusionary
rules. This, in turn, raises the probability that
every community will eventually have some
affordable units. When Massachusetts adopted
its totally voluntary inclusionary program in 1969,
only 2 of its 35 1 cities and towns had 1 percent
or more affordable housing. As of May 2000.
that had increased to 23 communities (Lohe
2000). with an additional 14 municipalities having
8 percent or more affordable housing/* Over
2 1 .000 units were produced under the law as of
October 1 999 ( Krefetz 1999). In 1972. 171
Massachusetts municipalities had no subsidized
housing; by 1 997. that figure was reduced to 54.
with the vast majority of them located in the
economically moribund western part of the state
(DHCD 1972; DHCD 1997).
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A statewide, locally-designed type of
program, as used in California and New Jersey,
may be preferable to the New England model for
two reasons. First, the New England voluntary
programs do not plan for the allocation of the
low-priced housing. Developers decide where it
will be built, without necessarily considering
actual local or regional needs. Only on appeal
are those needs assessed, and that is against an
arbitrary statutory guideline of 10 percent of the
housing stock of the local community. The two
statewide, locally-designed programs allocate
affordable housing to communities based on a
"fair share" of regional needs. While some
places in New Jersey have questioned their
allocation, at least there is some attempt to relate
location and need. Second, voluntary plans do
not ensure that all communities will have
affordable housing. Developers choose, and
they may decline to pursue inclusionary projects
in extremely hostile locations for fear of reprisal
on other, non-inclusionary proposals the
developer may be planning. Because the
statewide, locally-designed plans rest on a
mandate for all communities to accomodate a
"fair share" allocation, every municipality will
have some affordable housing.
The state-designed voluntary approach,
however, also has advantages. Locally-designed
plans can be rendered ineffective if there is an
imbalance between burdens and incentives, and
they are initially dependent on the commitment of
local officials for implementation ( Herr 2000).
Voluntary plans, in which the developer
establishes what the balance is. will be as
effective as long as inclusionary development
can be more economically efficient than the
alternative (Dietderich 1996). Because
developers implement the program, voluntary
programs will require little bureaucracy and are
very inexpensive to administer. There is no need
for regional authorities to determine the "fair
share" allocation, project growth and housing
needs, and oversee local plans. There is no
requirement to monitor the behavior of local
government to ensure compliance. Instead,
these functions are left to the developers who
initiate inclusionary proposals. The only real
expense to the state is providing an appellate
body to hear developer complaints.
One area where these programs may fall
short of their goals is in actually making
affordable housing available to the households
and groups that were previously excluded. 37
Wish et al. ( 1 997) note that only 7 percent of
households occupying units created in response
to the Mount Laurel decisions had moved from
cities to the suburbs, and 66 percent of those
were white. The main beneficiaries ofNew
Jersey's efforts were elderly white women
(Wish et al. 1997). In Massachusetts, the law
was amended after the state noted that
communities were permitting disproportionately
high percentages of elderly housing and lower
percentages of proposals for family housing.
After the amendment, only half of a community's
obligation under the law could come from elderly
housing (Stockman 1992).
Conclusions
Statew ide inclusionary development
programs are essential tools in efforts to reduce
suburban exclusion. Without them, municipalities
that want to keep out the poor will continue to
find adequate, legally-defensible means to do so.
The poor will be left to find housing in the
interstitial non-exclusionary areas where they
already are forced to reside. The jobs-housing
mismatch will persist. Poverty will remain
concentrated: growth will not be smart.
Both types of statewide programs discussed
in this article offer promising models, and neither
is clearly preferable. Both have characteristics
that could be profitably incorporated into the
other. They demonstrate the program elements
that must be addressed in the design of any
inclusionary program, statew ide or locally-
adopted, and the range of possible choices for
each of those elements. Five states have shown
what can be done. After careful consideration
of the options, an effective program can be
created that will reduce exclusion, open up
housing options for the poor, and still protect the
interests of local communities.©
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1268. cities, towns, villages, boroughs, etc.) and
counties.
Table of Cases " Local government can only exercise power
Beck v. Town ofRaymond, 1 1 8 NH 793. 394 A2d 847 delegated to it by the state, and so whether any
(1978) community can actually adopt an inclusionary
Board ofAppeals v. Housing Appeals Committee in ordinance is a matter of state law. In some states.
Department ofCommunity Affairs, 363 Mass 339. such as Maryland, local governments have such
294 NE2d 393 (1973) authority, which is why Montgomery County
Brittonv. Town ofChester, 134NH434, 595 A2d930 could create its Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit
(1991) ordinance. In other states, like North Carolina.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 ( 1 9 1 7
)
whether local government has that authority is
James v. ( altierra, 402 U.S. 137(1971) unclear.
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of States do not have unlimited power, particularly if
Mt. Laurel, 336 A2d 713 (N.J.) appeal dismiessed there is a "home rule" provision in the state
& cert, denied. 423 U.S. 808 ( 1 975) {Mount Laurel constitution. When Massachusetts first adopted
f)
its inclusionary law. its right to do so was
Southern Burlington Count}- NAACP v. Township of challenged as an infringement of local
Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158. 456 A2d 390(1983) governments' rights under the Commonwealth's
(Mount Laurel IT) home rule amendment. The claim was rejected.
Milage ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan however, in Board ofAppeals v. Housing
Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 Appeals Committee in Department ofCommunity
(1977)
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Affairs, 363 Mass 339, 294 NE2d 393 ( 1 973).
Statewide programs, as used in this article, are
those adopted by state government with some
affirmative requirement for local action or
limitation on pre-existing local power. This
definition includes the laws in California,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Not included as
"statewide" programs are those state laws
authorizing, but not requiring, local government
to adopt inclusionary regulations, as in
Maryland.
In Connecticut, Public Acts 89-3 1 1 , codified as
Connecticut General Statutes, §8-30g. In
Massachusetts, Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969,
codified as Massachusetts General Laws,
Chapter 40B, §§ 20-23. In Rhode Island, Public
Laws of 1 99 1 , Chapter 1 54, § I . codified as Rhode
Island General Statutes 45-54- 1 etseq.
In California, there are several provisions of state
law that apply. In New Jersey, New Jersey
Statutes 52:27D-301 etseq.
For example, Nantucket, Massachusetts, has a
mandatory inclusionary requirement for all
commercial developments ofover 4,000 square
feet enclosed space.
In fact, the right to prohibit multi-family units
from being built in the same neighborhood as
single-family houses was fundamental to the
original sanctioning of zoning by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Village ofEuclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 ( 1926). Justice
Sutherland, in his majority opinion, wrote:
"With particular reference to apartment houses, it
is pointed out that the development of detached
house sections is greatly retarded by the coming
of apartment houses, which has sometimes
resulted in destroying the entire section for
private house purposes; that in such sections
very often the apartment house is a mere parasite,
constructed in order to take advantage of the
open spaces and attractive surroundings created
by the residential character of the district."
(Euclidv. Ambler. 272 U.S. 365, 394 ( 1 926)).
245U.S. 60(1917).
Local regulations can't exclude minorities, of
course, since the Supreme Court ruled that local
ordinances that exclude based on race were
unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley.
However, the Supreme Court has, through its
decisions, left any judicial remedy for
economically exclusionary zoning to the states.
InJamesv. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137(1971), the
Court refused to grant privileged status to the
poor as it had in poll tax and criminal laws cases,
and it found a law requiring a referendum for
approval of all affordable housing to be race-
neutral. In Worth v. Seldin. All U.S. 490 ( 1 975 ),
the Court denied relief sought by outsiders
(residents, developers and non-profits) seeking
to challenge exclusionary practices of another
jurisdiction on the basis that the plaintiffs failed
to show specific injury from the defendant town's
actions. Finally, in Ullage ofArlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation. 429 U.S. 252 ( 1 977), the Court ruled
that disproportionate impact is not sufficient to
invalidate zoning decisions; there must be
evidence of intentional discrimination to amount
to a violation of equal protection. These cases
left matters largely to the states unless there was
clear evidence of racially discriminatory motives.
At the state level, the law may be different, and
discrimination based on wealth may be
prohibited. Courts in some states have limited
the impact of exclusionary regulations by finding
state constitutional or statutory limitations that
impose obligations to consider regional housing
needs in local regulations and decision making.
See Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township ofKit. Laurel. 336 A.2d 7 1 3 (N.J.)
appeal dismissed & cert, denied. 423 U.S. 808
(1975) (Mount Laurel I) and Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township ofMl Laurel. 92
N.J. 1 58. 456 A.2d 390 (1983) {Mount Laurel II).
which established the rule in New Jersey. Beck v.
Town ofRaymond, 1 1 8 NH 793, 394 A2d 847
(1978), and Brittonv. Town ofChester. 134NH
434, 595 A2d 930 ( 1 99 1 ). did the same in New
Hampshire. Other decisions have looked to
regional considerations when examining zoning
in New York. Pennsylvania and California.
North Carolina allows cities to adopt zoning
regulations "[f]or the purpose of promoting
health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the
community," N.C.GL. §160A-38I. "The
regulations shall be made. ..with a view to
conserving the value of buildings..." N.C.G.L.
>;160A-383. Counties have the same authority
under § 1 53A-340 and § 1 53A-34 1
.
In California, the state Department of Housing
and Community Development reviews the local
housing elements and may withhold
discretionary funding from municipalities whose
housing elements do not comply with state
requirements. In New Jersey, communities whose
housing elements are not certified by the Council
on Affordable Housing (COAH), the
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administrative agency established as part of the
legislative reaction to the Mount Laurel
decisions, are exposed to potential builder's
remedy lawsuits in state court.
One voluntary plan is in Orange County.
California. Originally, the county had a
mandatory plan, but it changed. The county has
been one of the most successful in the state at
producing affordable units, with over 6,400 of the
statewide total of 20.000 units. Most of the
Orange County units were produced under the
mandatory program (Burchell et al. 1 994).
They may. very well, also recognize that their
own actions may have contributed to the
problem. There is no evidence to indicate that
the local preference for mandatory programs is an
attempt to deny any responsibility for the
shortage of affordable housing in the community.
It may be an honest effort to address the
possibility that both governmental and private
sector decisions have played a role in the
creation of exclusionary suburbs.
336 A.2d 7 1 3 (N.J. ) appeal dismissed & cert,
denied. 423 U.S. 808(1975).
92 N.J. 1 58. 456 A.2d 390 ( 1 983 ).
Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township ofMt. Laurel, 92t<U. 158. 198,(1983).
To avoid the builder's remedy, a community had
to adopt a housing element that presented a
reasonable prospect of meeting its "fair share"
obligation. That plan had to be certified by
COAH. Upon certification by COAH. the
community would receive a six year exemption
from builder's remedy lawsuits. Some New Jersey
municipalities have not sought certification, and
so the builder's remedy remains possible in those
jurisdictions.
California, with its variety of locally -designed
programs, offers examples of these criteria.
Under the Massachusetts law. only government
agencies, non-profits and limited dividend
corporations are eligible.
Under the Rhode Island law, for-profits may
qualify if the project is for rental housing and the
inclusionary units will remain affordable for at
least 30 years.
Other program requirements may affect the extent
of density bonus needed to compensate the
developer. For example, the lower the allowable
price of the inclusionary units, relative to their
cost of production, the greater the compensation
needed.
For example, with a strictly local plan, the
developer only has to move to the next town.
With a uniform statewide plan, he or she would
have to move to another state. In the latter
situation, the developer obviously would less
likely serve the same housing market as he or she
would in a move from one town to the next.
Wheeler ( 1 990) describes the local permitting
process as negotiation. The threat of the
possible loss of state funding could be one factor
a developer could use to convince the local
permit granting authority that the municipality
would be better off allowing the inclusionary
project than not.
For example, without the unitary permitting
process, a developer might have to submit one
application to rezone the property from single-
family to multi-family, increase allowable density,
reduce frontage and setback requirements, and
increase maximum floor area ratio to conform with
the proposal. He or she might need separate
approval to subdivide the parcel into multiple
building lots once it is rezoned. Then he or she
might need a certificate ofcompliance from the
local conservation commission, a certificate of
adequate public facilities from the traffic safety
committee, etc.
In practice, there are techniques local boards can
use to slow permitting, but the process is still
faster than having to obtain multiple permits
(Stockman. 1992).
A legal doctrine which allows courts to presume
that local actions are valid and requires a party
challenging to prove that they were not.
The "rational reasonable basis." "clearly
erroneous." and "arbitrary and capricious"
language is commonly used as the standard of
review in decisions on appeals of local
government actions. There are other bases upon
which a local decision could be overturned,
including lack of procedural due process. The
regulation upon which the decision is based may
have been beyond the authority of the
municipality to adopt. The standards cited are
those applicable to challenges to a procedurally
proper decision based upon a statutorily sound
local regulation.
It should be noted that 70 of the pro-developer
HAC decisions were without conditions. That
means that the permits were granted as originally
requested by the developer, without conditions
to which he or she might have agreed had the
local government negotiated a permit acceptable
to the developer.
One reason why I do not consider Oregon's
growth management svstem inclusionary is
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because it does not limit the price or rent of any
units.
The program is called the Tax Exempt Loans to
Encourage Rental Housing (TELLER). The
Commonwealth has other programs with other
requirements, both for rental and ownership
units.
That figure is based on my analysis of data from
Massachusetts DHCD, MHFA and other sources.
The goals for the Mount Laurel decisions and
subsequent legislation creating COAH were:
""To provide housing opportunities in the
suburbs for poor urban residents who had been
excluded by past suburban zoning practices.
To ameliorate racial and ethnic residential
segregation by enabling blacks and Latinos to
move from the heavily minority urban areas to
white suburbs" (Wishetal. 1997: 1276).
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Local Inclusionary Housing Programs and
the Prospects for North Carolina
Lanier Blum
Many ofthe nation's rapidly growing
communities are confronting an ironic paradox
—
the stronger the local economy, the more acute
the shortage of affordable housing. 1 This is
certainly true ofNorth Carolina's metropolitan
areas. Generations of public investments in
highways, schools, community facilities and
services, universities, research, industrial
recruitment, and hospitals have created a great
deal of the value of urban/suburban land and
generated tremendous wealth and rapid growth
in this state's metropolitan areas. But every
year, more of the people who keep these
services and institutions operating cannot afford
to live near their jobs. Moreover, in rapidly
growing communities like the Triangle, powerful
market incentives encourage builders to produce
high-cost homes. The combination of regulatory,
public investment, and market factors has
resulted in a dramatically expanding affordability
gap for households with low- and moderate-
incomes. What can local governments do to
encourage the development of lower cost homes
throughout these growing communities in North
Carolina?
Lanier Blum chairs the Policy Committee of
the North Carolina Low-Income Housing
Coalition and is currently launching a
housing program at the Triangle J Council of
Governments. She holds a Masters Degree in
City and Regional Planning from the Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The Housing Affordability Gap in North
Carolina's Rapidly Growing Communities
The 1990 Census indicated that 38 percent
of the renters in North Carolina and 20 percent
of homeowners were inadequately housed for
the following reasons: they could not afford a
safe and suitable house: they lived in
overcrowded homes: or their homes lacked
minimum plumbing facilities. Ifthe same
proportions ofhouseholds are inadequately
housed today, we can conservatively estimate
that 334,800 renters and 1 86,000 home owners
— a total of 520.800 households— cannot
afford a safe, suitable home. 2
Unfortunately this estimate of families in
need is very likely low because the affordability
gap widened during this decade. Inflation-
adjusted incomes ofNorth Carolina households
in the bottom two fifths of the income range
have not increased since 1990. and incomes in
the middle fifth grew by only one half ofone
percent annually.' Even in an affluent and
rapidly growing area like the Triangle, the
number ofjobs that pay low wages grew faster
than jobs paying high wages. 4 At the same time,
in the metropolitan markets where 78 percent of
North Carolinians live, existing housing cost data
indicate that rents and home prices have risen
dramatically, often by over 80 percent.
-
This widening housing affordability gap
necessitates a change in North Carolina
legislation to enable local inclusionary housing
programs that accommodate the growing need
for affordable housing in North Carolina.
Local Inclusionary Housing Programs
Local inclusionary programs are based on a
requirement in a community's development
ordinance that new residential developments
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(usually of more than a specified size) include
some homes with moderate sales prices or rents.
To compensate builders and apartment owners
for the lower price of these homes, these
developments are allowed higher housing
densities.
Some communities also offer priority for
processing and/or preference in granting building
permits, fee reimbursement for permit processing
or community facilities, or lower-cost site
improvement standards. For example, in transit
service areas, reduced parking requirements are
granted. To make homes more affordable and
create longer-term rental affordability, local and
state governments often subsidize or purchase
some of the affordable homes. Otherwise, deed
restrictions usually record the terms of
affordability. More specifically, local
development ordinances typically incorporate
provisions that describe:
How and when the requirement for
affordable homes applies.
At least 10 to 25 percent of new homes
must typically be affordable. Usually,
residential developments that are larger
than between 10 and 50 homes must
include some that are affordable. Small
projects are often excluded to encourage
infill development.
The extent of the density bonus.
In most North Carolina communities, the
bonus can be designed to fully
compensate or even reward the
developer. In areas with extremely high
land costs (higher than in this region), or
where additional density is not feasible
(because of environmental or political
factors), this may not be possible. As a
result, the community may have to add
subsidies to compensate builders.
The target income of inclusionary
home renters or buyers.
Sales are usually required to be
affordable to households with a
maximum 80 percent of the area median
income and rents affordable to
households with up to 50 percent. Some
programs require fewer affordable units
to be sold or rented at costs well below
market.
Design, site and construction
standards. Inclusionary programs work
best and homes sell most readily when
the affordable homes look similar to the
higher price homes.
A system for marketing the homes and
selecting, qualifying and preparing
buyers or renters.
Local government or housing
authority rights to purchase some
lower priced homes.
The Benefits of Local Inclusionary Housing
Programs
Inclusionary programs are designed to
generate two main benefits. First, inclusionary
programs can significantly increase the supply of
homes affordable to families with incomes of40
to 80 percent of the household median. The
potential impact of these programs can be
particularly significant in rapidly growing
communities. For example, if Raleigh's
development ordinance had required developers
to allocate 10 percent of the units in new
developments ofover 50 homes, in 1999 alone,
builders would have constructed more than 550
affordable homes with a value of over $40
million. If 10 percent of North Carolina homes
built in the 1990s were moderately priced, nearly
24.000 of the 28.000 households that are now
paying more than 50 percent of their income for
housing could have found homes near their jobs
that fit their budgets.
The second benefit of inclusionary programs
is that they disperse affordable housing
throughout new developments in an area.
Dispersing affordable housing means that
poverty is not so concentrated in schools and
neighborhoods. Often this can also translate to
shorter commutes for low-income workers.
Furthermore, ifcompatibly designed, moderately
priced homes are a ubiquitous component of
every new neighborhood, and resistance to
affordable housing may diminish.
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The Nation's Model for Success
During the past two decades. Montgomery
County. Maryland, developed one of the highest-
producing inclusionary housing programs in the
United States. It has been described as "the
nation's most innovative housing program," in
Governing Magazine, and by David Rusk as
"the nation's model for success in replacing
exclusionary zoning with inclusionary zoning."6
Montgomery County's zoning ordinance requires
that 1 2 to 15 percent of nearly every new
development of over 50 homes be moderately
priced homes. 7
Since 1975, builders in Montgomery County
have produced over 10.300 moderately priced
homes, an average of over 400 homes yearly.
Instead ofbuilding "projects." Montgomery
County's public housing authority purchased
1 .600 of these homes throughout the community.
These homes are rented to very low-income
households and are nearly indistinguishable from
their expensive neighbors.
Montgomery County's program has served
as a model for neighboring communities. A
coalition led by homebuilders in Fairfax County.
Virginia, advocated that the state authorize an
inclusionary zoning ordinance adopted in 1 990.
Affordable housing production was slow until
1 995, when the County modified its ordinance to
more closely mimic Montgomery County's.
Today, with a total population of about one
million. Fairfax County' has 1 . 1 00 moderately
priced homes in 100 developments and about 600
more approved for construction. Town homes
and condominiums have been sold to owners
with incomes below 70 percent of the median
income. Two thirds of the apartments are rented
to tenants with incomes below 70 percent of
median and one third rented to tenants with
incomes less that 50 percent of the median
income. The Fairfax County housing authority
has the right to purchase or lease one third of the
moderately priced homes. By 2000, it had
purchased 40 homes to rent to very low-income
tenants and as group homes for tenants who also
receive residence-based support services.
Designing A Local Inclusionary Housing
Program
Hundreds of communities across the nation
have implemented inclusionary programs, and
many more are developing new ones tcday,
providing a wealth of information about how to
tailor them to local markets and goals. Many
stable and tested inclusionary housing programs
work powerfully and enjoy strong support, but
others have little or no impact. Local
inclusionary housing programs work best in cities
or counties where:
Job growth or community features
generate strong housing demand, but
market prices are not affordable to low
and moderate income households.
Land costs are high, but land is available
and suitable for developing large
subdivisions.
Community facilities (especially
wastewater treatment) are available to
support urban development density (four
units/acre or more).
The amount and density of residential
zoning is consistent with local plans for
expansion ofcommunity facilities, and
new large subdivisions are located in
areas that have access to public
transportation and jobs.
Residential density permitted under
existing zoning is not already higher than
the market will support, and all rezoning
will require including affordable housing.
A local or regional housing department,
partner agency or land trust:
(a) recruits and helps prepare buyers
and tenants: and
(b) purchases or leases moderately-
priced homes, then sells or rents them to
lower income households and/or extends
the term of affordability beyond the
required minimum.
Political leaders strongly support the
expansion and dispersion of housing that
is affordable to low-wage-earning
members of the community.
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Inclusionary housing programs have the
potential to significantly increase and disperse
moderately priced homes throughout new
neighborhoods in rapidly growing communities.
Because they can be designed to fully
compensate developers in most projects, they
can help add housing that households with 40 to
80 percent of the median income level can afford
without additional assistance. Adding subsidies
can expand this program's capacity to work in
very expensive places, to reach lower income
families, and to keep the housing affordable
longer or permanently.
From voices of experience, like Eric Larson,
Director of Montgomery County's Moderately-
Priced Housing Program, we have learned that
the details of program design are critical to the
effectiveness of the program. "The success of
the Montgomery County program relies on the
fact that every development is included. Our
design standards have been effective at blending
the moderately priced homes in with their
neighbors and enhancing marketability.
Moderately-priced homes house
disproportionately more non-white families,
helping to meet the community's goals for
desegregation and housing more of the
employees of Montgomery County firms.
"
s
Dave Flannagan. homebuilderand President
of the National Capital Area Builders" Council,
advocates. "The Moderately Priced Housing
Program is not to be feared. It is a win-win
program that should be replicated in other rapidly
growing communities."" The strength of the
program impacts in the Capital area demonstrate
why more and more North Carolina localities are
asking for explicit state enabling authority to
deliver the program here.
The Prospect for Local Inclusionary
Housing Programs in North Carolina
Some North Carolina local governments
already negotiate for affordable housing as a
condition of rezoning. Others have developed
creative mechanisms that aim for the same goal
through less direct means, such as limiting the
size of some homes in each development, and
making affordable housing one of the community
assets covered in adequate public facility
ordinances. Some attorneys advise that North
Carolina local governments already have the
authority they need, broadly construed, to
implement inclusionary programs. However,
most attorneys agree that local governments
need enabling authority to develop
comprehensive and uniformly applicable
ordinances. This legislation would also clarify
that zoning ordinances and processes, tools that
have long been used to exclude affordable
housing, can be transformed. With these
changes, zoning can be used to include more
housing for people with a greater range of
incomes to live in the same neighborhoods.©
Notes
1 The State ofthe Cities 2000, US Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
1990 Census, updated by Office of State Planning
population estimates, with 1990 Census percents
of households that rent, own. and have housing
needs.
NC Budget and Tax Center. March 2000.
4 Caryn Ersnt. Institute ofGovernment web site,
unpublished paper.
5 2001-2005 NC Consolidated Plan.
David Rusk, "Overcoming America's Core
Problem: Concentrated Poverty." in Cities in the
21" Century. Urban Land Institute 2000, and
Christopher Svvope, "Little House in the
Suburbs," Governing, April 2000.
The only exceptions are several multi-story
condominiums, where the density bonus could
fully compensate the builder, and where the
builder was instead allowed to contribute to a
local housing trust fund.
8
Eric Larsen gave this advice in a speech on May
27. 1 999 in Research Triangle Park, NC,
sponsored by the Triangle J Council of
Governments Smart Growth Committee.
Videotape filmed in 2000 by the National Capital
Area Builders' Council.
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The Community Land Trust:
Preserving Affordable Housing Stock in
Orange County, North Carolina
Sonia Garrison, Christine Westfall, Alison
Weiner, and Erin Crossfield
Orange County, North Carolina, located in
the state's booming Research Triangle region, is
increasingly becoming an area in which only the
affluent can afford to live, threatening the
economic, racial and cultural diversity that is
needed for a healthy society. In response to the
county's dwindling supply ofaffordable housing,
area activists and governments together
established the Community Land Trust in
Orange County (CLTOC), incorporated in 1999.
Two years later, CLTOC is now beginning to
realize its goal of creating housing that will
remain permanently affordable for generations.
The Housing Crisis in Orange County
The economy of the Triangle region is
thriving, primarily due to the presence of several
universities as well as a large number of
research and technology firms. From 1990 to
1 997. Orange County experienced population
growth of 14.3 percent, with projections for the
next decade increasing to 16.4 percent. 1 As a
result ofthe booming population and prosperity
of the region. Orange County is faced with a
As members of the Orange Community
Housing Corporation Staff, Sonia Garrison
sei~ves as the Community Land Trust in
Orange County (CLTOC) Membership
Coordinator, Christine Westfall serves as the
CLTOC Project Manager, and Alison Weiner
serves as the Chair of the CLTOC Board of
Directors. Erin Crossfield is a master s
degree candidate in City and Regional
Planning at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill.
severe lack of affordable housing. Incoming
residents have turned the housing market into a
seller's market, and the cost of housing has risen
dramatically. Many new high-income homes and
housing developments are cropping up around the
county, and undeveloped land near the town
centers is rapidly disappearing.
Home closing prices reflect the unaffordable
nature of Orange County's homes. For the
eleven months ending November 2000. the
average selling price for all homes sold in Orange
County was $235,404. The average price for
new homes was $272,354. : Families would need
to earn approximately $85,000 to $ 1 00,000 per
year to afford sales prices in that range.
Unfortunately, incomes in Orange County are
not rising as fast as inflating housing prices. In
1998, families of four that earned the median
income in the county ($54,700) were only able to
afford 24 percent of the detached homes, and
families earning 60 percent of the median income
($32,820 for a family of four) could afford only
six percent of the detached homes. 3 In addition to
the costs of homeownership. rental costs in the
area are also out of reach for many working
individuals and families. Rental units are in short
supply, in part because more than 1 5.000
University ofNorth Carolina students live off-
campus. 4
Traditional Solutions
As early as the 1980s, non-profits and citizen
activists raised the issue ofthe diminishing supply
of decent and affordable housing with the town
and county governments in Orange County (the
four governments are Orange County, the Town
of Chapel Hill, the Town of Carrboro, and the
Town of Hillsborough). In response, the
governments used public funds to create
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subsidized, affordable homes to be sold to low-
and moderate-income buyers.
These homes were typically built or
renovated by non-profit developers in the area.
Area governments often subsidized these homes
in the form of a no-interest "second mortgage"
to the buyer. The second mortgages usually
ranged from $ 1 0.000 to $25,000. which allowed
the homes to be sold to buyers who earned 80
percent or less of the county's median income.
The initial owner of the home was permitted
to sell it to whomever he or she wished.
However, if the homeowner sold the home to
someone who earned more than 80 percent of
the median income, the buyer was required to
reimburse the second mortgage subsidy to the
government. Otherwise, he or she was required
to pass the subsidy on ("roll it over") to the next
buyer. In either case, sellers were allowed to
realize all of the gains from any increases in
property value since they bought the home. This
system ensured that when the home resold, the
public subsidy would either be recaptured by the
government or passed on to the next low-income
buyer. However, this system did not give sellers
any financial incentive to sell to a low-income
buyer; sellers would make the same amount of
money from the sale whether or not they sold the
home to an income-qualified buyer.
In addition, rapid increases in area housing
values soon made these homes unaffordable to
income-qualified buyers in spite of the second
mortgage system. In the latter part of the 1990s,
homes in Orange County appreciated at rates in
excess of five percent a year, while personal
income rose only three percent or less. Hence,
if the initial owner of an affordable home resold
his or her home in as little as five years, it would
often be unaffordable to a low- or moderate-
income buyer even if the buyer received the
"rolled over" second mortgage subsidy. Many
publicly subsidized homes did in fact re-sell
unaffordably on the open market in as little as
five years after they were built. These homes
were then permanently lost as affordable housing
stock, and the cost of building new homes to
replace them was far greater than the amount of
second mortgage subsidy which was recaptured
bv the government.
The Community Land Trust Model: An
Alternative Solution
A land trust is a familiar concept to both
planners and lay-people because of its use in
land conservation. Conservation land trusts
preserve land for community health and
enjoyment: they protect fragile ecosystems and
wilderness, as well as open space and
recreational areas. Community land trusts play a
similar role as custodians of land that belongs to
the community and are committed to good
stewardship of that land. The difference lies in
the use of the land; community land trusts usually
have a primary mission of holding the land to
create and preserve permanently affordable
housing for those with low and moderate
incomes. According to the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1 992, a
community land trust (CLT) is an organization
that:
acquires parcels of land, held in
perpetuity, primarily for conveyance
under long-term ground leases;
transfers ownership of any structural
improvements located on such leased
parcels to the lessees; and
retains a preemptive option to purchase
any such structural improvement at a
price determined by a formula that is
designed to ensure that the improvement
remains affordable to low- and moderate-
income families in perpetuity?
Community land trusts sell affordable homes
to low- and moderate-income buyers while
maintaining the ownership of the land underneath
those homes. When a homeowner buys a CLT
home, he or she gains title to the improvements
and simultaneously enters into a ninety-nine year
ground lease for the land. At the end of the
lease term, the homeowner (or "Lessee") may
renew the lease for another ninety-nine years.
This guarantees that the homeowner can live
securely on the land, just as if he or she owned
it. In addition, the homeowner may bequeath the
home to a relative. The lease fee is usually kept
low. just enough to cover the property taxes that
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CLTs must pay annually on the land as well as
some administrative fees.
The ground lease includes provisions that
specify the rights and responsibilities of the
homeowner as well as the CLT. The most
significant provision is the resale formula. The
resale formula ensures that when and if the
homeowner decides to sell the home, he or she
w ill sell it at a price affordable for buyers in the
same income bracket. In addition to the down
payment and any equity the homeowner has
accrued, he or she realizes some percentage of
the total appreciation of the home, depending on
how many years he or she lived there before
selling it. (Each CLT has a different resale
formula, determined by the board of directors,
reflecting the economic conditions of the area.
The Community Land Trust in Orange County
gives homeowners approximately 25 percent of
their appreciation. ) This formula allows the
homeowner to realize some appreciation from
his or her investment in the home, but is not
enough to remove the house from the affordable
housing stock for low- and moderate-income
residents. In this way. CLTs try to balance the
interests of the community with those of
individual homeowners.
When and if the CLT homeowner decides to
sell his or her home, it must be sold to an
income-qualified buyer, defined as someone who
earns less than the percentage of the median
income that is specified for that home at a price
determined by the resale formula. This ensures
that the home remains permanently affordable
and is kept in the hands of low- and moderate-
income buyers. In addition, CLT homes must be
occupied by the their owners and cannot be
rented out.
Other than the resale and rental restrictions.
CLT homeowners enjoy all of the benefits of
traditional homeownership. They can make
improvements to their homes and can keep the
grounds in the style that suits their tastes and
lifestyles. Owners can use the home in any way
that is consistent with zoning codes, in the same
manner as the owner of any other home can.
They can take advantage of the tax benefits
offered to all homeowners. Most importantly,
because the around lease has a ninety-nine vear
term, they can rest assured that they will not be
displaced by a landlord and can enjoy the
emotional benefits ofknowing that their home will
be theirs for as long as they want it.
All CLT homeowners are voting members of
their CLT. As members, the owners are involved
in making key decisions about the actions of the
land trust, including voting for the board of
directors. Members also have the opportunity to
be elected to the CLT board, which implements
the decisions of the Trust and oversees the
actions of CLT employees. As membership
organizations with members drawn from land
trust leaseholders and the wider community.
CLTs can provide greater local control over land
and housing ownership than is commonly
experienced by low- and moderate-income
community members.
In addition, many CLT homeowners enjoy the
support that this type of trust can offer. Because
the relationship between the homeowner and the
CLT is by definition a long-term one. many CLTs
offer their members on-going sen ices such as
home repair and budgeting classes. These
efforts serve both parties by helping to ensure
that the individuals as well as the neighborhoods
maintain a high level of stability.
The History of the Community Land Trust in
Orange County
In November 1 997. the Towns of Chapel Hill
and Carrboro formed a task force to establish a
community land trust as one tool for effectively
creating long-term affordable housing. These
two towns had experienced the greatest
affordable housing crisis in the county, and both
were fast running out of developable land that
could be used to build new housing. In the
neighboring City of Durham (in Durham County),
the then ten-year-old Durham Community Land
Trust had successfully created permanently
affordable, community-controlled housing and
promoted neighborhood revitalization in a low-
wealth Durham neighborhood. Inspired by the
Durham Community Land Trust, the task force
researched community land trust programs
nationwide (there are about 120 such programs).
As a result of the task force's findings, the
governments of Carrboro. Chapel Hill and
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Orange Countyjointly voted to help fund a new
community land trust in Orange County.
The aspect of the community land trust
model that most interested these governments
was the creation of permanently affordable
housing. Government staff and officials
determined that a community land trust could
make the most efficient use of the limited public
funding and the remaining land available for
affordable housing. Instead of re-creating each
affordable housing unit lost to the marketplace
with new public funds and land, the community
land trust model would allow subsidy money to
be invested once, after which it would remain
with that unit to keep it affordable permanently
Mission and Structure of the Community
Land Trust in Orange County (CLTOC)
The primary mission ofCLTOC is to develop
permanently affordable housing for low- and
moderate-income people and to promote
neighborhood improvement through the equitable
and responsible stewardship of land and other
community resources. Secondary purposes are
to protect the natural environment, promote the
ecologically sound use of land and natural
resources, and support the long-term health and
safety of the community. In addition to low- and
moderate-income housing development, CLTOC
can also facilitate the creation of special needs
housing, group homes and rental housing.
Additional goals ofCLTOC are to combat
neighborhood deterioration caused by absentee
ownership and lessen neighborhood tensions that
are caused by gentrification and the
displacement of low-income people.
CLTOC was designed to be community and
resident controlled. Putting partial control of the
organization in the hands of the residents ensures
that the CLTOC appropriately serves its target
populations. CLTOC provides services to people
who live or work in Orange County and who
earn less than 100 percent of the area median
income. Most of CLTOC"s projects serve those
earning less than 80 percent of the area median
income. Community control is attained through
the use of a voting membership as well as a
board of directors that is made up of community
members, government representatives and CLT
homeowners. The membership includes all those
who own or lease a house through the CLTOC
program and community members who are
supportive of the community land trust concept.
In order to ensure cooperation rather than
competition with other local affordable housing
developers, one of the positions on the board is
reserved for a representative of another non-
profit organization that provides housing or other
services for low-income people.
Current Projects for CLTOC
CLTOC is constantly in the process of
identifying potential future building sites. Once a
site is found it must be evaluated; topography,
possibilities for access to infrastructure, zoning,
environmental status, and land value are
examined. If the land is appropriate for housing
development and subsidy money is available.
CLTOC can make an offer on the land (or the
land can be donated). Once the site is acquired.
CLTOC must obtain liability insurance on it. pay
taxes and insurance, and take care of any
necessary maintenance on the property.
CLTOC works with developers to build or
rehabilitate housing on the land.
While the housing is being developed.
CLTOC conducts outreach to the community-at-
large and to potential homeowners. It assists
future homeowners with arranging the
appropriate public and private financing to
purchase the homes. CLTOCs work is not
finished when the homes have been purchased; it
is responsible for paying taxes and insurance on
the land, collecting the ground lease fees,
working with the homeowners to maintain their
homes, and educating the public on community
land trusts. When the owner wishes to sell,
CLTOC will help the seller arrange for a new
buyer and market the home. Currently. CLTOC
is developing fourteen town homes on land
donated by the Town of Chapel Hill. Ten of the
homes are already spoken for. and completion of
the project in the spring of 2001 is eagerly
anticipated.
A Sticky Issue
The CLTOC program does an effective job
of ensuring that homes are always available to
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the sector of the population with low- and
moderate-incomes. Part of this lowered cost is
achieved through the removal of the price of the
land from the price of the home. However, even
this subsidy would be insufficient to guarantee
permanent affordability without restricting the
resale price of the home.
This is an important consideration for
potential CLTOC home buyers. While CLTOC
homes do help people build equity and are a
much better financial investment than renting,
they are not investment properties that can offer
large returns. In the past century, many
American families have built wealth by realizing
large gains through the appreciation of their
homes. Traditional affordable homeownership
programs have invested large amounts of money
to help a few families benefit from buying their
home affordably. then selling it at a much higher
price on the open market. By restricting the
price at which land trust homes can be re-sold,
the community land trust model balances the
homeowner's opportunity to build wealth with
the community's need for permanently
affordable housing.
Is the benefit to one family of realizing full
equity on the sale of its home more valuable than
the benefit to the community of guaranteeing
affordable housing for countless families? This
is a particularly important consideration to
minorities, who have historically been denied
opportunities to create wealth, including the
opportunity for land ownership. It is reasonable
that some may question the CLT model wherein
wealth accumulation is restricted.
Despite these concerns, the Community
Land Trust in Orange County shows much
promise as a way to both increase and preserve
Orange County's stock of affordable housing.©
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A Disaster Relief and Quality
Improvement Loan and Grant Program
for Childcare Providers
Dan Broun
In September of 1999. Eastern North
Carolina experienced a natural disaster of epic
proportions. Flooding as a result of Hurricanes
Dennis. Floyd and Irene left entire towns under
water. And now. even after the floodwaters
have receded, the effects of the disaster are
expected to linger for years to come.
Unfortunately, it appears that federal funds for
disaster relief will not be as much as originally
hoped— the total package will only reach $800
million, far from the $1.76 billion which North
Carolina elected officials determined was
necessary to meet the needs of communities in
the East. An example of this shortfall is that an
estimated 1 .000 to 1 .500 flood-affected small
businesses and non-profits will not be served by
Federal Emergency Management Agency or
Small Business Association disaster assistance,
which will leave at least a $25 million gap in
funding. In addition, the federal relief package
failed to include $2 1 million to address child care
needs that the governor of North Carolina
originally requested.
Recognizing that child care providers were
among the organizations most heavily hit and
determining that quality child care is essential to
rebuilding efforts. Self-Help. one of the largest
community development financial institutions in
the nation, has created a grant program
Dan Broun is a Development Associate with
Self-Help in Durham, North Carolina. He
holds a Masters Degree in City and Regional
Planning from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and is a former editor
of Carolina Planning.
supported by the state of North Carolina to
finance loans to child care providers impacted by
the flooding. The program uses $1 .5 million
committed from the North Carolina Division of
Child Development and $3 million from the North
Carolina Partnership for Children to finance the
real estate needs of child care providers, a
category of assistance that cannot be covered by
state funds.
As part of the project, Self-Help, through the
Frank Porter Graham Child Development Center
at UNC-Chapel Hill, plans to evaluate the
program's most unique feature: up to half the
state-funded loan can be forgiven if the child
care demonstrates quality improvements. This
component of the program offers an opportunity
to determine whether child care operators will
improve the quality of their operations if they are
given an incentive such as loan forgiveness. In
addition, the evaluation will assist Self-Help in
determining which relaxed underwriting criteria
impact loan performance of child care providers.
This program, although focusing on child
care, has the potential to offer two important
lessons for other economic development efforts.
First, it represents a comprehensive approach to
mitigate the impacts of a disaster. Second, it
tests the hypothesis that tying grants or loan
forgiveness to quality improvements can make a
positive impact.
Background of Self-Help
As a community development financial
institution, a major part of Self-Help's goal is to
strengthen community resources. This is done
through its Community Facilities Fund (CFF).
Created in 1994. the CFF works with
organizations that support families and build
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community infrastructure in low-wealth
neighborhoods and rural communities. Since its
establishment, the CFF has made $27 million in
loans to nonprofits and human service providers.
The CFF works in three main areas: children and
families: community-based health care; and other
non-profits.
The primary way in which CFF works with
human service providers is through the provision
of loans. Self-Help offers loans to these
organizations to acquire or rehabilitate real estate
or equipment as well as for working capital.
Self-Help also offers bridge loans as a way to
see non-profit organizations through the time
between when a pledge of support is made and
when the funds are received. Self-Help staff
also provide significant amounts of technical
assistance to borrowers, offering them both pre-
and post-loan closing help in facility development
financing and operating a sound business
operation. Staff from Self-Help travel
throughout the United States working with states
and community organizations to help them devise
effective strategies for working w ith human
service providers.
The Community Facilities Fund is part of an
organizational structure at Self-Help that works
to provide a "one-stop" shop for financial
assistance for its constituents, particularly
minorities, women, rural citizens, and low-wealth
families. The Center for Community Self-Help.
the parent organization of the Self-Help Credit
Union and the Self-Help Ventures Fund, was
founded in 1 980 to help expand economic
opportunity for low-income workers in North
Carolina, where even today more than 27
percent of full-time workers earn less than
$ 1 5,000 a year. It soon became evident that
Self-Help could best achieve this goal by helping
to remove a key barrier to economic opportunity:
the lack of access to capital. These key
constituencies not only had little or no net worth,
but they were seldom able to obtain credit from
traditional lenders. Thus, in 1984 the Center"s
founders created two financing affiliates, the
Self-Help Ventures Fund and the Self-Help
Credit Union, to begin to make loans to people
not served bv conventional financial institutions.
Of equal importance. Self-Help offered the
non-financial assistance—management help for
entrepreneurs, household budget counseling for
individuals, and technical advice for nonprofits
—
that would help borrowers achieve their goals.
When Self-Help cannot provide technical
assistance in-house, it is able to refer borrowers
to a wide range of agencies and organizations
that can best meet their needs.
The Self-Help Ventures Fund, a 501(c)3
organization, manages Self-Help's non-traditional
loans, such as higher risk commercial loans and
low-income mortgage pools. The Self-Help
Credit Union is a federally-insured financial
institution that makes most of Self-Help's home-
and real estate-based commercial loans.
Self-Help's Child Care Lending Program
The Community Facilities Fund began
operations through an interest in supporting child
care providers. The effort has been extremely
successful. To date. Self-Help has made over
$15 million in loans to child care providers and
created or preserved almost 13.000 child care
spaces. Self-Help's loans have assisted a broad
spectrum of child care. From the small provider
needing a loan to make improvements to become
licensed by the state, to a Head Start program
wanting to buy and renovate a building in a
neighboring town to expand its services, to a
provider using a loan to purchase a building to
move from an in-home facility to a stand-alone
center. Self-Help's assistance has been vital in
improving access to child care across North
Carolina.
A major part of that effort has been the
Child Care Revolving Loan Fund (CCRLF).
Under the program. Self-Help receives funding
from the state Division of Child Development,
which makes possible below-market loans to
child care providers. One example of the way in
which the CCRLF program works comes from a
Self-Help loan made to a child care provider in
Winston-Salem. North Carolina.
Self-Help used $20,000 from the state's
Child Care Revolving Loan Fund to help an
African-American child care operator expand
her home-based center to a larger stand-alone
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facility. The CCRLF money, loaned at five
percent interest, was used to support the
working capital needs of the borrower. Because
of the federal restrictions on CCRLF funding.
Self-Help used its other loan capital to fund the
remaining $95,000 needed to purchase a stand-
alone facility. This money was loaned out at
Self-Help's standard commercial loan rate based
on the higher cost of funds. Combined with the
CCRLF money, Self-Help was able to help the
borrower serve even more children in a high-
quality setting.
Creating a Disaster Relief Program
As the full extent of the flooding from the
1 999 hurricanes was beginning to be understood,
the state Division of Child Development
approached Self-Help about expanding CCRLF.
The state has invested $1.5 million in Self-Help
to Finance child care providers affected by the
flooding. This emergency fund may be used by
child care providers to recover from both
physical and economic damage (e.g., business
interruption or loss of customers). Specifically,
these providers may use the loans to:
recover physically and economically
from the hurricanes and related flooding
(renovations, working capital, lost
equipment including playground
surfacing and other supplies, vehicles);
expand to fill gaps left by providers who
were forced to close; cr
improve quality.
At the request of the Division. Self-Help has
agreed to relax the credit requirements to help
meet the needs of those centers/homes affected
by hurricane floods. However, centers/homes
must have been solvent prior to the disaster as
part of the qualification requirements and
individuals must meet minimum credit history
standards. Loans are made available to
providers at a five percent interest rate.
Approximately $500,000 of the state's grant to
Self-I lelp will be used to cover the forgiven
portion of the loans, administrative fees, and
potential losses that may occur due to the
relaxed underwriting criteria.
Under the state's program, a portion of the
loan can be forgiven if the child care provider
makes improvements in its program quality.
Quality improvement will be measured through
the state's new "Five-star" quality assessment
system. The amount of the loan that will be
converted into a grant will be tied directly to the
number of stars that the provider has achieved
by the fourth year of the loan. Child care
providers that maintain a high quality standard
are also eligible for loan forgiveness. The
eligibility for loan forgiveness will be evaluated
at the end of four years from the date of loan
origination, or in the event of change of
ownership or in prepayment of loan.
Expanding the Program
This program, ambitious as it is. was unable
to meet some of the most vital needs of child
care providers. Specifically, because the state's
funding actually comes through the federal Child
Care Development Fund program, money cannot
be used to finance any real estate transactions
or major renovations of a facility. If this
emergency fund is to truly assist North
Carolinians in their drive to recover from the
flooding, then this funding gap must be closed.
Thus Self-Help proposed to complement the
state initiative by making it a comprehensive
source of subsidized funding. Working with the
North Carolina Partnership for Children. Self-
Help was able to secure a $3 million capital
grant that allows it to offer the same low Five
percent interest rate for the real estate needs of
child care providers as well as providing this
initiative with adequate scale to make it a
noteworthy experiment on the quality front.
Funds gained through the partnership are not
part of the forgiveness program.
Although the precise demand for these loans
cannot yet be determined, the effects of the
flood suggest that the market and need exists.
As is the case with the state's investment, any
funds not loaned to flood-affected child care
providers would be made available to child care
providers in other parts of North Carolina. As
the funds are repaid, they will form a permanent




As a part of this program, Self-Help is
working closely with the state to monitor the
effect that the loan forgiveness program is
having on improving the quality of child care. In
addition, it will allow Self-Help to investigate how
relaxed underwriting criteria impact the
performance of loans to riskier borrowers.
Preliminary investigations into other efforts
around the country suggest that this program is
unique: any lessons learned will be shared with
policy makers, community development financial
institutions, traditional lenders and governmental
agencies across the nation.
The Frank Porter Graham Child
Development Center has begun a proposed six-
year evaluation of the program that will ask:
"Does the quality of care in child care
centers and family child care homes
improve for providers who participate in
the loan-forgiveness program? If so. is
the quality improvement greater than
that for providers who received
traditional loans that did not include a
loan-forgiveness component?"
"How does the loan-forgiveness
program influence (or not) the quality of
care over the life of the loan? For
example, do providers use the loan to
purchase new equipment that increases
their star rating? Do providers who
participate in the loan-forgiveness
program participate in more staff training
and development activities than do
providers who received traditional
loans?"
According to the evaluation plan put forth by
Frank Porter Graham, "the first question will be
answered by comparing over the life of the loan
the star ratings of providers who participate in
traditional, non-forgiveness Self-Help loan
programs. The second question will be
answered by obtaining detailed information about
how the loan was spent by providers, what
additional funding the providers received, and
what quality improvement activities the providers
and their staff participated in over the life of the
loan."
The Program to Date
Receiving funding in the early part of 2000.
Self-Help immediately began to aggressively
market the program to child care providers.
Loan officers traveled throughout the eastern
part of the state holding workshops and offering
information about the program. To date, Self-
Help has closed ten loans worth over $835,000.
These child care providers serve over 800
children. The following is an example ofone of
the loans Self-Help made.
Step by Step Child Care is located near
Princeville. one of the communities hardest hit by
hurricane-related flooding. While the child care
center itself did not suffer any physical damage,
most of its clientele could not get to the center,
causing a substantial business interruption. To
assist the provider, Self-Help offered a $4,000
loan to provide working capital for the center.
The loan will allow the provider make up for
much of the revenue shortfall she suffered in the
immediate aftermath of the flood. Governor Jim
Hunt visited the center recently as part of a
region-wide tour promoting state flood-relief
efforts.
Conclusions
Self-Help believes that this disaster relief
program offers a unique opportunity to bring
quality child care to North Carolina and. through
its example, to states throughout the nation.
After the devastation of September 1999, the
need for such a program has never been greater.
If communities in the eastern part of the state
are to recover completely, assisting in the care of
their children must be a vital component of that
effort. In addition, the unique loan forgiveness
component of the program provides a chance to
determine how such an incentive can impact
quality improvement by child care providers.
Thus, the flooding in Eastern North Carolina can
be seen not only as a crisis but also as an
opportunity. Through this program. Self-Help
will not only assist in the rebuilding of Eastern
North Carolina but in the creation of a program
that will dramatically improve the quality of child
care throughout the region.®
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Call for Papers
Articles • Opinion Pieces • Case Studies • Book Reviews •
Artwork • Project Descriptions
Carolina Planning, a student-run publication of the Department of City and Regional
Planning at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, is currently accepting
articles for the Winter 1999 issue. Our journal focuses on topics relevant to practicing
planners in the Southeast. We are particularly interested in articles on Transportation
and Historic Preservation for the upcoming issue.
Submission Guidelines:
Manuscripts should be up to 25 typed, double-
spaced pages (approximately 7500 words).
Please submit two paper copies and one copy
on 3.5" diskette in WordPerfect, Microsoft
Word, or ASCII text. Citations should follow
the author-date system in the Chicago Manual
of Style, with endnotes used for explanatory
text. Legal articles may use Bluebook format.
Tables and graphics should be camera ready.
Please include the author's name, address,
telephone number, and email address, along
with a 2-3 sentence biographical sketch.
Carolina Planning reserves the right to edit














October 1 for Winter issue submissions
June 1 for Summer issue submissions
We accept submissions on a year-round basis. These dates are flexible. If you have
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